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Comments
ADMISSIBILITY OF HOSPITAL RECORDS AS EVIDENCE
IN MISSOURI
The importance of hospital records and the questions arising out of their use in
evidence is not to be underestimated. This is demonstrated by the many Missouri
(51)
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cases in which their admission or exclusion, and their effect when admitted have
played a vital role in the outcome of the case. No attempt is made in this Comment to
discuss the wide variety of information contained in such records.' This is not to
minimize, however, the significance of the particular types of data in the record in
question in a given case. The objective of this Comment is to analyze the present
Missouri law on the questions of: (1) admissibility, (2) privilege, and (3) weight to
be given the records assuming they are admitted in evidence.
I. ADisssmrrv
A. In General
Hospital records are, of course, a form of hearsay evidence and it is therefore
necessary to bring them within one of the exceptions of the rule against the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence if they are to be introduced in evidence. A consideration of
the various exceptions as applied to hospital records may be helpful in evaluating the
present approach employed in Missouri.
B. Business Entries Rule
One hearsay exception is the "business entries" rule. An understanding of this
method would appear especially helpful in that it has been said that the business
records as evidence law2 presently in force in Missouri "crystallized" the business
entries exception.3 The common law business entries exception developed under the
theory that records kept in the regular course of a going business should ordinarily
have a high degree of trustworthiness and accuracy. This would be true because the
success or failure of a business is to a large extent dependent upon the care and com-
pleteness with which the records of that business are maintained. There was also a
substantial necessity for the admission of records in lieu of demanding the attendance
of the person who compiled the records because his appearance at the trial might be
inconvenient or impossible. Therefore, the elements of necessity and the presumed
reliability of the records of a going business resulted in the development of this
exception.
It may be readily seen that hospital records meet the standards of the business
entries exception rather well. The typical hospital of today could certainly be termed
a "going business," 4 especially in view of the large scale operations of the modem
hospital. There is good reason to rely upon the accuracy of the records and doctors
often base their decisions upon such reliance. Hence there is no valid reason to
insist upon the physician's personal testimony. In discussing the guaranty of truth-
fulness of a hospital chart, the Maryland supreme court states:
This record is one of the important advantages incident to hospital treatment,
for it not only records for the use of the physician or surgeon what he
1. For a discussion of the subject matter covered by hospital records see Hale,
Hospital Records as Evidence, 14 So. CALIF. L. REv. 99 (1941).
2. §§ 490.670-.690, RSMo 1949.
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himself observes during the time he is with the patient, but also records at
short intervals the symptoms, condition, and the treatment of the patient
during the whole time of the physician's absence. Upon this record the
physician depends in large measure to indicate and guide him in the treat-
ment of any given case. Long experience has shown that the physician is
fully warranted in depending upon the reliability and trustworthiness of such
a record. It is difficult to conceive why this record should not be reliable.
There is no motive for the person whose duty it is to make the entries, to
do other than record them correctly and accurately. On the other hand,
there is the strongest reason why he should. First, because of the great
responsibility, he knowing that the treatment of the patient depends largely
upon this record, and if it be incorrect it may result, and probably will result
in the patient's failure to receive proper surgical or medical treatment
which failure might be followed by serious consequence or even death.
Second, the entrant must realize and appreciate that his position is dependent
upon the accuracy with which the record is made. Third, as was stated by
Tindall, C.J., in Poole v. Dicas, 1 Bing. (N.C.) 649: 'It is easier to state what
is true than what is false; the process of invention implies trouble in such a
case unnecessarily incurred.' 5
There is also a great necessity for admitting the records and not requiring the per-
sonal testimony of the physician who compiled the record. Such a requirement
would work an undue hardship on the already overworked physician and, it is
submitted, with little advantage resulting from such procedure. In the normal
situation it is unlikely that the physician would be able to recall with any great
accuracy the details of the patient's case. As a practical matter, he would have to
refresh his memory from the record or some type of memorandum. His testimony
would therefore be but a repetition of the information available from the hospital
record in the first instance.
To come under the business entries exceptions, the record must comply with
certain requirements. It must be an original entry. The entryinvolved must have
been made shortly after the transaction it records. A further requirement which
has caused some confusion is that it must be made by one with first hand knowledge
of the facts entered. It is usually required in the jurisdictions admitting hospital
records under this procedure that someone, often the custodian of the hospital
records, identify them as records kept as a regular hospital practice and give some
testimony as to the details of that practice. 6
C. Official Statements Exception
Missouri courts prior to the enactment of the business records as evidence act
admitted hospital records under the theory that where there was a legal obligation
to keep such records, they became public records. As with the business entries
exception, there is an assurance of trustworthiness connected with official records.
There is a presumption that the duty imposed by the applicable statute and the
responsibility of public office statisfies the requirement of accuracy. The necessity
5. Globe Indem. Co. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 447, 137 Atl. 43, 46 (1927).
6. See McCoRmic, EVIDENCE §§ 283-88 (1954); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 728 (1942).
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of using records instead of testimony of the official also exists. It would disrupt the
transaction of the official's business to compel him to testify in person.7
Gatti v. Wells 8 is a widely cited case illustrating this approach. In this case a
St. Louis ordinance required that the superintendent of the city hospital keep an
individual record of each patient's
'... history, condition off admission, all examinations made, all treatments
and operations, condition from time to time and at time of discharge, and
reasons for discharge.' 9
There was also a Missouri statute which required that a record be kept of all
personal and statistical particulars of patients in such hospitals.' 0 The question arose
in the Gali case as to the admissibility in evidence of hospital records to show the
cause and extent of the plaintiff's injuries. The court held that for such records to be
admissible it was not necessary that the law under which they were compiled also
provide for their admission."1 It was decided that these were official public records
and competent evidence of the facts which were required, by law, to be kept. The
contention was made that the records of the hospital were not open to public
inspection and that they therefore failed to come within the public documents
exception. The court held that in view of the privileged status of the records this
was ordimarily true. But where the privilege had been waived, such records did
become open to the public and, thereupon assumed the status of "public records."
In the case of Kirkpatrick v. Wells,12 records of a private hospital were admitted.
These records had been kept in compliance with the statute involved m the Gatl
case. It was argued that the hospital was not a public institution and that its records
were therefore not admissible within the Gallti decision. The court held that "under
the general rule all records required by law to be kept are admissible if properly
identified."13 The records kept by a private hospital in compliance with the law
were said to be of equal dignity with the records of a public hospital. The persons
making entries in the records in this case were said to be performing a public duty.14
Subsequent cases have reaffirmed and clarified the Gali and Kirkpatrick holdings
admitting hospital records under the official entries exception.' 5
7. For an analysis of the official statements exception see 1 G -ErA, EvinDNcE
§§ 483-85 (16th ed. Wigmore 1899).
8. 209 Mo. App. 460, 239 S.W. 894 (St. L. Ct. App. 1922).
9. Id. at 472, 239 S.W. at 898.
10. § 5812, RSMo 1919.
11. Accord, Sullivan v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 241 Mo. App. 56, 231 S.W.2d
822 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950).
12. 319 Mo. 1040, 6 S.W.2d 591 (1928).
13. Id. at 1045, 6 S.W.2d at 593.
14. In this connection, see Brovin v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 F.2d 159 (8th Cir.
1932).
15. Borrson v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry., 351 Mo. 214, 172 S.W.2d 826 (1943)
(fact that hospital was not shown to be a public institution held to be of no signifi-
cance in view of statutory provision requiring such records to be kept); Russell v.
Missouri Ins. Co., 232 S.W. 812 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950) (repeal of statutory require-
ment after records had been compiled held not to affect their admissibility);
[Vol. 24
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D. Admissibility Under the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act 16
The Missouri supreme court in the case of Melton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.17
stated that the purpose of the act was to bring some organization into the law in
regard to the admissibility of business records in evidence and that it was designed
to avoid "the many-antiquated and technical rules -of the common law" surrounding
this question. Prior to the Melton decision, the St. Louis Court of Appeals, discussing
the admission of hospital records, had suggested that the act "may hereafter have
some bearing upon the admissability of such records."' 8 The court in the Melton,
case agreed with the St. Louis court and referring to the broad language employed
in section 490.67019 where "business" is defined as including "operation of institutions,
whether carried on for profit or not," held that hospital records did come within the
terms of the act. The later case of Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco RV. 20 refused
to admit hospital records but based the refusal on the Melton decision. Stating that
the act applied, the court held that in this case there had been no identification of,
or testimony concerning, the record in question, and that the record was a "narrative
summary" apparently prepared from other data which was not introduced in
evidence, thus refuting the contention that the record was a business entry. This,
said the court, reduced the record to the status of hearsay and made it inadmissible
under the rule against hearsay evidence. The Grayl case then would appear not to
Sullivan v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 11 (admissibility of hospital records
held not to depend upon a statute so providing but upon fact they had been kept
pursuant to statutory requirement); Wright v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
153 S.W.2d 747 (St. L. Ct. App. 1941) (city hospital records held admissible but not
on same plane as governmental records and instant records were subject to im-
peachment); Allen v. American Life & Acc. Ins. Co., lI1 S.W.2d 450 (St. L. Ct. App.
1938) (records required by law to be kept held admissible where properly identified);
Vermillion v. Prudential Ins. Co., 230 Mo. App. 993, 93 S.W.2d 45 (St. L. Ct. App.
1936) (records kept pursuant to statute held admissible subject to privilege where
such claim is made); White v. American Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 90 S.W.2d 118 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1936) (hospital records kept under statutory requirements held admissible).
16. The act reads as follows:
490.660. Short title. -Sections 490.660 to 490.690 may be cited as "The Uni-
form Business Records as Evidence Law."
490.670. "Business" defined. -The term "business" shall include every
kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions,
whether carried on for profit or not.
490.680. Records competent evidence, when. -A record of an act, condi-
tion or event, shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the
custodian, or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode
of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at
or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the
court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such
as to justify its admission.
490.690. Interpretation and construction. -- Sections 490.660 to 490.690 shall
be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it.
17. 363 Mo. 474, 485, 251 S.W.2d 663, 669 (1952) (en banc).
18. Russell v. Missouri Ins. Co., 232 S.W.2d 812, 815 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950).
19. Quoted supra note 16.
20. 363 Mo. 864, 254 S.W.2d 577 (1952).
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limit the Melton decision but only to point out that hospital records must comply
with the usual requirements for admission under the act as they are applied to
other business records.2 1
Granted that hospital records do come within the terms of the act, admissibility
is still not a matter of course as is illustrated by the Gray case.2 2 It is necessary
that the records be introduced in the manner required for the admission of other
types of records. Section 490.68023 sets out these standards. The rules stated in
the statute apparently have been strictly observed by Missouri courts as is
illustrated by a study of the cases where records have been admitted under it.
The record must contain information relative or incident to hospital treatment.2 4
It must be identified and testimony must be presented as to the mode of its
preparation.2 5 Allen v. St. Louis Pub.-Serv. Co.2 6 is a case pointing out the views
of the Missouri supreme court here. In this case the records of the St. Louis City
Hospital were produced by the medical librarian of that hospital under a subpoena.
She gave testimony identifying the records as those concerning the plaintiff; that
the hospital kept them in the regular course of its business; that the entries had
been made at or near the time that the patient was seen; that the doctors wrote the
"history, findings, progress notes and all the diagnoses." 2 7 The witness did not
know of her own personal knowledge whether all of the entries in question had
been made immediately after examination but it was shown that she did know
the procedure under which the records were normally compiled. The court held
that this testimony was sufficient to qualify the record under the act. It was also
stated that to require the production of additional proof would defeat the purposes
of the enactment of the law. "To construe the act too strictly would be to repeal it,"28
said the court.
In Kraus v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. 2 9 part of the hospital record was excluded
because there had been no showing that the patient had given the information con-
tained in that part. The Missouri supreme court construed section 490.680 as good
grounds for the trial court to act to exclude any questionable portion of the record.3 0
The record itself in this case was said to have indicated that the patient was uncon-
scious and was therefore unable to give the information contained in the record.
In the case of Kirkpatrick v. American Creosoting Co.31 objection to the use of
21. For illustrations of this view see Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 365 Mo.
677, 285 S.W2d 663 (1956); Kraus v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 269 S.W.2d 743
(Mo. 1954).
22. Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., supra note 20.
23. Quoted supra note 16.
24. Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., supra note 20; Melton v. St. Louis Pub.
Serv. Co., supra note 17.
25. Gray v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., supra note 20.
26. 365 Mo. 677, 285 S.W.2d 663 (1956).
27. Id. at 680, 285 S.W.2d at 665.
28. Id. at 681, 285 S.W.2d at 666.
29. 269 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1954).
30. The section is quoted supra note 16.
31. 225 Mo. App. 774, 37 S.W.2d 996 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931).
[Vol. 24
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the hospital record by a doctor to refresh his memory on the witness stand was
sustained on the grounds that the record was not the doctor's own memorandum.
The witness had determined the correctness of the record (a personal history of
the patient) by comparing it with his own notes which contained the patient's
history as the doctor had taken it from the patient. The court held that the history
did not purport to be a record made contemporaneously with the happening it
purported to relate and it was not supported by the oath of the person who had made
out the record.
In Baugh v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. 32 the trial court excluded a part of a hospital
record stating that the patient had said that at the age of seven he had had chicken
pox and was told by a doctor that he had a leaky heart. The court held that although
the act eliminated the hearsay objection so far as to dispense with the requirement
that the person who made the record had to be produced in court, it does not ordi-
narily render a statement admissible which is "hearsay based on hearsay." That
portion of the record was held inadmissible under the act.
These cases exemplify some of the standards set for admission of the records
under the act. They also serve to emphasize that the main significance of the act is
the codification of the common-law rules. All of the common-law requirements seem
to have been carried over intact but the over-all result points to less confusion and
doubt as to just what must be done to render a record properly admissible.
H. PRIVILEGE ARsIsNG OuT or THE PHYSIcAx-PAT=ENT RELATIONSHIP
A. In General
A very important problem to be considered is whether or not the hospital record
may be inadmissible because of the privilege resulting from the physician-patient
relationship which surrounded the compilation of the record. This privilege is
specifically provided for by statute in Missouri.33 There is no doubt that the privilege
does apply to the use of hospital records. The record is inadmissible under approxi-
mately the same circumstances under which the physician would be held to be in-
competent to testify. In the case of Rush v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. it was said:
.. but here the evidence was incompetent for any purpose, absent a waiver
of privilege, and consequently its exclusion by the court was proper,
irrespective of the extent to which it might have contradicted any evidence
for plaintiff.34
The statutory privilege is directed toward encouraging confidence in the patient
so that he will thereby make a full disclosure to the physician of his condition.35
With this understanding of the reason for the existence of the privilege it is some-
what easier to anticipate when it will apply.
It has been held in Missouri that the burden of proof is on the party seeking
32. 307 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1957).
33. § 491.060, RSMo 1949.
34. 63 S.W.2d 453, 456 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933).
35. Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 30 S.W.2d 190 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930).
1959]
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to introduce the records to show that the privilege does not apply, once a prima
facie showing of the existence of the privilege has been made.38 The privilege exists
only where the records or the information therein come within the requirements
of the statute. For example, a listory given by the patient to the person compiling
the record to the effect that the patient had had syphillis prior to his treatments in
the hospital where the record was being taken, was held to be confidential and
inadmissible.3 7 The information, for the privilege to apply, must have been acquired
from the patient by the physician or surgeon while attending the patient in a
professional capacity and the information must have been needed to enable the
physician or surgeon to treat the patient 3 8 If the information is acquired in this
manner and then copied into the record, the record is then inadmissible if the
patient asserts the privilege and does not later waive it.39 But where the doctor does
not occupy a position of "confidence" to the patient then the information is not
privileged. Illustrating this is the case of BouglignV v. Metropolitan Life In&. Co.40
The physician in this case had been employed by the defendant fin4uance company
to examine the patient for the purpose of determining whether or not he was a good
insurance risk. It was held that information acquired under these conditions was not
subject to the privilege, there being no confidential relationship existing between
the doctor and the patient.
B. Waiver of the Privilege
It has long been established in Missouri that the physician-patient privilege is
not absolute but that it may be waived by the patient at his election.41 It was stated
in Chamberlin v. Chamberlain that:
In the case of husband and wife and physician and patient it is the relation-
ship which bars the communications as evidence. A waiver goes to the rela-
tionship and where exercised as to some confidences which could otherwise
be excluded it opens the door for proof of other communications.42
It has been held, and logically so, that the waiver of the privilege as to the testimony
of the physician also operates as a waiver of the privilege as to the hospital records.43
It is difficult to generalize in this area but clearly the waiver must be (1) voluntary,
(2) intentional, and (3) with full knowledge of the contents of the record to which
the privilege is to be waived. Thus, in the case of Rush v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 4 4
36. Vermillion v. Prudential Ins. Co., 230 Mo. App. 993, 93 S.W.2d 45 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1936).
37. Gilpin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 566, 132 S.W.2d 686 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1939).
38. Allen v. American Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 83 S.W.2d 192 (St. L. Ct. App. 1935).
39. Smart v. Kansas City, 208 Mo. 162, 105 S.W. 709 (1907) (en banc); Marx v.
Parks, 39 S.W.2d 570 (St. L. Ct. App. 1931).
40. 133 S.W.2d 1094 (St. L. Ct. App. 1939).
41. Carrington v. City of St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208, 1 S.W. 240 (1886).
42. 230 S.W.2d 184, 189 (St. L. Ct App. 1950).
43. Andrews v. Washington Natl Ins. Co., 93 S.W.2d 1045 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936).
44. 63 S.W.2d 453 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933); accord, Gilpin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
supra note 37, (patient gave testimony concerning information on records on cross
examination and on redirect; held, no waiver).
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it was held that information obtained from the plaintiff on cross examination as to
the treatment he had received did not constitute a waiver so that the defendant
was entitled to introduce in evidence the hospital records of that treatment It was
said to have been involuntarily given and was therefore not a waiver which removed
the protection of the privilege. Similarly, when the beneficiary of an insurance
policy who was illiterate signed a paper giving the insurer permission to examine
the hospital records of the insured, it was held to be a jury question as to-whether
or not the beneficiary had consciously waived the privilege.4 5 Merely filing a
doctor's certificate as proof of death did not operate to waive the privilege of the
hospital records 4 6 But when the patient called three doctors and permitted them
to testify freely as to the patient's condition and gave his own testimony concerning
his condition, all of which was done voluntarily, it was held the patient did waive
the privilege.47
Graham v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co.48 presented the question of whether
a waiver, once made, can later be withdrawn. In this case insured answering a
question of the proof of loss form used for disability claims, as to whether the
insured had ever had certain diseases stated, "Get statement from hospital." After
the insurer had examined the records at the hospital, it rejected the claim. Suit was
brought by the insured and on the insurer's attempt to take depositions at the
hospital, the insured notified the hospital to keep the records confidential. The court
held that the insured had waived the privilege by telling the insurer on the proof
of loss form to get the statement. It was further decided that, although a waiver can
be withdrawn under proper circumstances, it cannot be withdrawn after it has been
acted upon. That it had been acted upon here was obvious since the insurer appears
to have based its rejection of the claim on the information it had obtained from
the hospital records. 49
I. COxCLusnV SS
A recurring question in Missouri has been what effect or weight to give to
hospital records which are admitted in evidence and remain uncontradicted and
unimpeached by the other party. Until very recently, there was substantial authority
for the view that where the records are uncontradicted and unimpeached they
are then conclusive of the facts recited therein. This doctrine seems to have originated
in the St Louis and Kansas City courts of appeal. A new approach was taken in
Shaw v. American Ins. Union.5 0 The St. Louis court held that where the records
were contradicted by parol evidence the record was not conclusive as to the question
of the patient's alleged misrepresentation of her health which was involved in this
case. The court said:
45. Andrews v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., supra note 43.
46. Fitzgerald v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 149 S.W.2d 389 (St. L. Ct. App. 1941).
47. Foerstel v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 241 S.W.2d 792 (St. L. Ct. App. 1951).
48. 267 S.W.2d 692, 693 (K.C. Ct. App. 1954).
49. See also Toler v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 248 S.W.2d 53 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952).
50. -33 S.W.2d 1052 (St. L. Ct- App. 1931).
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*.. for a writing to be conclusive as to the facts stated therein, it must be
an instrument or record having legal efficacy, to which the person to be
bound is in some way a party, or the truth of which he vouches for or is
estopped to deny.5'
The records in this case were said to be prima facie evidence of the information
therein. But the court held that the written evidence was merely evidence to be
"weighed" along with the other evidence. The fact that the records were written
and the rebutting evidence was oral was held to affect only the weight and not the
conclusiveness of the record over the oral evidence introduced in contradiction of
the record. It was noted by the court that the records were ex parte and largely
hearsay with no opportunity for cross-examination afforded the other party. The
St. Louis court in the case of Mach v. Western & So. Life In. Co. stated:
The declaration of physicians respecting the insured's state of health set
down in these hospital records are convincing, but, unless undisputed, are
not conclusive.52
The Mach case gives an indication of the trend at that time toward holding that the
records when not denied would be conclusive. A case from the Kansas City Court of
Appeals, Smith v. Missouri Ins. Co.,53 repeated the holding in the Mach case, stating
that unless impeached or contradicted the records were prima facie evidence of the
facts recited and the jury could not disbelieve them. The records were attacked by
the testimony of witnesses to the effect that the insured had appeared to them to be
in good health contrary to the inference to be drawn from the records. The St. Louis
Court of Appeals in White v. American Life & Ace. Ins. Co.54 held that the hospital
records were conclusive- when the contradictory testimony was from lay witnesses
"confessedly" unfamiliar with the symptoms of the disease involved. A case which
at first glance seems inconsistent with the White decision is Allen v. American Life &
Ace. Ins. Co.55 The records in the Allen case were held not conclusive even though
the contradiction was only from lay testimony. The case may be distinguished on
i-ts facts. The patient in this case did not give the information contained in the
records herself as she was in a dying condition upon her entry into the hospital.
The court said the information on the records was merely cumulative and purely
hearsay evidence of admissions against interest. Another more significant feature
of the case for present purposes was that the conditions described by the records
were such that they would surely have been noticeable by lay witnesses even though
such witnesses were unfamiliar with the precise symptoms of the disease involved.
This would serve to distinguish the case from the White decision. These and other
51. Id. at 1055.
52. 53 S.W.2d 1108, 1109 (St. L. Ct. App. 1932).
53. 60 S.W.2d 730 (K.C. Ct. App. 1933).
54. 90 S.W.2d 118 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936); cf. Smiley v. Bergmore Realty Co.,
Inc., 229 Mo. App. 141, 73 S.W.2d 936 (K.C. Ct. App. 1934) (records held not con-
clusive where there was contradiction in the form of expert testimony).
55. 83 S.W.2d 192 (St. L. Ct. App. 1935); cf. Hendricks v. Natl Life & Ace. Ins.
Co., 240 Mo. App. 557, 210 S.W.2d 706 (K.C. Ct. App. 1948) (testimony of doctor whohad not seen patient for almost one year prior to her death held insufficient to
overcome inference from hospital records).
[Vol. 24
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Missouri cases developed the doctrine to the point that it became well established,
at least so far as the two courts of appeals were concerned. In view of the holding
in the Shaw case it is difficult to explain how this doctrine could develop and in
part at least in the same court from which the Shaw case originated. Goodwin '0.
Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,5 6 was decided after the enactment of the business records
as evidence law. The court held -that the records involved were conclusive in the
absence of contradictory or impeaching testimony, indicating the above doctrine
governed even under that statute.
A recent case has caused a complete reversal of the trend sketched above. This
is the case of Baugh v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co.,5 7 a most significant decision so far as
the question of the use of hospital records in evidence is concerned. The Missouri
supreme court held in this case that for documentary evidence to be conclusive it
must have "legal efficacy to which the one sought to be bound is in some way a
party, or the truth of which he vouches for, either expressly or in legal effect or is
estopped to deny."5 8 This rule is the Shaw rule restated. The records in the Baugh
case were said to be merely the findings of the doctors and their opinions and
therefore did not come within the requirements set out by the court. The court
examined the cases where it had been held by the St. Louis and Kansas City courts
of appeals that the rule of conclusiveness extended to hospital records. No sufficient
basis was found for the extension. The court suggested that the cases might have
been the result of an inept application of the general rule. The statutory provision
requiring hospitals to keep rather extensive records was also thought to have a
possible bearing. This section is now repealed and hospitals are now required to
keep only records of statistical data. Perhaps the old section may have caused the
courts to give undue importance to hospital records kept under it. The court in the
Baugh case stated that, irrespective of the situation under the old statute, it is:
... now well settled that the admissibility of hospital records is presently
governed by the provisions of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Law.5 9
It was noted that the law made no provision for the weight to be afforded the records
admitted under it. Also, hospital records are not specifically mentioned in the act.
The court found, therefore, that the general rule applies: unless the record is of the
type considered binding, it is for the jury to consider it along with the other
evidence offered and believe or disbelieve the facts before it. The bily value of
written evidence over oral evidence, said the court, is that the written evidence is
usually considered to be more reliable because of the "frailties of human memory."
But this distinction has no bearing on the conclusiveness of the evidence since both
the written and the oral evidence are the products of a human agency. It was pointed
out that had the physicians who made the entries testified at the trial and given
their opinions in that manner such testimony would not have been conclusive. The
56. 279 S.W.2d 542 (K.C. Ct. App. 1955).
57. 307 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1957).
58. Id. at 664.
59. Id. at 665.
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court found no reason to treat the written opinion any differently from the oral
opinion. It was suggested that the person who compiles the record is not under oath
and might not give as serious consideration to the opinion which he expresses on
the record as to the one he gives on the witness stand when he is called to testify
in person.
The Goodwin case decided after enactment of the act and referred to above was,
of course, completely inconsistent with the Baugh decision. Therefore the Goodwin
case and the others voicing the same view were overruled so far as they held that
uncontradicted and unimpeached hospital records are to be taken as conclusive.
Prior to the Baugh decision there was good reason to assume that hospital
records were to be treated somewhat differently from other records admitted under
the business records as evidence act. Unlike the ordinary business record, hospital
records were held to be conclusive when uncontradicted or unimpeached. It is felt
that the Baugh case is therefore, a valuable contribution in this area of the law
because it has brought hospital records back in line with other records of equal
dignity. It should enable the attorney to have a more distinct interpretation of the
act as it applies to this question. Analogies may be drawn to other types of records
with a greater degree of accuracy than before. It is submitted that, as the court in
the Baujh case said, there appears to be no reason to treat hospital records any
differently than other business, records. Holding them to be conclusive had the
effect of giving an undue advantage to the party relying upon them. Under the old
rule, it was more desirable to introduce the record than to introduce the doctor
even if he were-.readily available. As stated earlier, the record evidence might be
somewhat more reliable than the physician's testimony but this should not detract
from the fact that the record is not open to cross examination while the personal
testimony is subject to cross examination. But. as the Baugh case holds, the relative
reliability of the written evidence over the oral evidence should have no significance
so far as the conclusiveness of either is concerned. This should be only one fact for
the jury to consider.
IV. CONCLUSION
In general it -may be stated that hospital records come within the business
records as evidence act. Under that law they are subject to the physician patient
privilege should it exist in a given situation. Under appropriate circumstances, the
privilege can be waived. Upon admission hospital records are not conclusive but
are merely to be weighed, along with other evidence introduced, by the jury.
WILLIAM J. ESELY
CREATION AND ENFORCEABILITY OF
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AT LAW
CEAaTOa-ni GENE
In order to restrict the enjoyment of a fee, a covenant may be used. This can be
termed an equitable easement or a servitude or a restrictive covenant. In order to
[Vol. 24
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create an enforceable covenant at law the covenant must be in writing.' The covenant
must also touch and concern the land,2 and satisfy the privity requirement of the
jurisdictionP
WXXmG
The Missouri court in Chiles v. Fuchs stated:
A covenant must be in writing, and the written words used must be such
as will clearly authorize the inference or imputation in law of the creation
of a servitude or restrictive covenant 4
A covenant was not considered created where broken lines were placed on a
plat marked "building lines."5 However, a building line may be established by
express language in the legend of a recorded plat.6
The court should keep in mind the purpose of covenants when they are being
construed;7 however, where there is reasonable doubt as to the purpose of the
covenant, the covenant should be construed against the grantor in favor of the free
use of the property.3
ToucH &D CoNcmn
In order to maintain an action at law, the complainant, in addition to satisfying
the requirement of a writing, must be able to show that the covenant touches and
concerns the land and that there is privity of estate between the two litigants.
In the celebrated Spencer's Case 9 it is said, "yet if the thing to be done be merely
collateral to the land, and doth not touch or concern the thing demised in any sort,
there the assignee shall not be charged." This has been accepted everywhere today.
An early Missouri case discusses this problem.1 0 P owned Blackacre and Whiteacre
in fee simple. He constructed a net work of ditches to drain the water from his land
into a lake and had a flume to carry away water and prevent it from backing
upon his land when heavy rains fell. This flume was constructed on Blackacre. P
conveyed Blackacre, subject to his rights in the ditches, to A who conveyed to B,
who conveyed to C, who then conveyed to D. The deed between P and A was not
recorded and had burned. P conveyed a portion of Whiteacre, subject to his rights in
1. Chiles v. Fuchs, 363 Mo. 114, 249 S.W.2d 454 (1952); Jenkins v. John Taylor
Dry Goods Co., 352 Mo. 660, 179 S.W.2d 54 (1944).
2. Poage v. Wabash, St L. & Pac. Ry, 24 Mo. App. 199 (K.C. Ct. App. 1887).
3. State ex rel. Natl Subway Co. v. St Louis, 145 Mo. 551, 46 S.W. 981 (1898)
(en banc); State ex rel. Kane v. Johnson, 123 Mo. 43, 27 S.W. 399 (1894); Haley
v. Bagely, 37 Mo. 363 (1866); Vancourt v. Moore, 26 Mo. 92 (1857); Cook v. Tide Water
Associated Oil Co., 281 S.W. 2d 415 (Spr. Ct App. 1955); McCoy v. Wabash Ry., 203
S.W. 249 (K.C. Ct. App. 1918); Winters v. Wabash Ry., 122 Mo. App. 282, 99 S.W. 34
(K.C. Ct. App. 1907); Ladd v. Montgomery, 83 Mo. App. 355 (St. L. Ct. App. 1900).
4. 363 Mo. 114, 118, 249 S.W.2d 454, 456 (1952).
5. Zinn v. Sidler, 268 Mo. 680, 187 S.W. 1172 (1916).
6. Bernard v. Winkley, 130 S.W.2d 196 (St. L. Ct. App. 1939).
7. Godfrey v. Hampton, 148 Mo. App. 157, 127 S.W. 626 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910).
8. Conrad v. Boogher, 201 Mo. App. 644, 214 S.W. 211 (St L. Ct. App. 1919).
9. 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (K.B. 1583).
10. Poage v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry, 24 Mo. App. 199 (K.C. Ct. App. 1887).
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the ditches, to B, who conveyed to C, who conveyed to D. D did not maintain the
ditches and as a result the portion of Whiteacre that P retained was damaged. There
was a question of whether the covenant, P's rights in the ditches, touched and con-
cerned the land. The Missouri court held that the covenant touched and concerned
the land, since the covenant affected the land, thus following Spencer's Case. The
court regarded the covenent as a dependent covenant since it required something to
be done. The court said, "in such case it becomes appertenant, and runs with the
land."'1
The court in Withers v. Wabash Ry., distinguishes collateral and dependent
covenants as follows:
A collateral covenant is such as appears to be foreign from the instrument,
not touching the land or its value, or the value of its reservation, or of the
term, but a distinct matter put in by the parties, which does not appear
necessarily to influence the demise or grant . .. [A] dependent covenant
is such as requires something to be done or omitted which represents the
theory on which it depends. In such cases it becomes appertenant and runs
with the land.' 2
This means the agreement must affect the promisee or the promisor in respect to
his interest in the land. If this is not met, then the benefit or the burden is said
to be collateral.' 3
PRIVTY
Even though the covenant is in writing and touches and concerns the land,
there also must be privity of estate between the litigants before an action at law
can be maintained. In an equitable suit for the enforcement of the covenant privity
of estate in a technical sense is not required. Equity only requires that the servient
owner take with notice. In dealing with what satisfies the privity requirement at
law, the courts are far from being in agreement. It seems that in considering this
problem the courts have followed one of three approaches. One view considers the
privity requirement satisfied if one shows that he is a successor to one of the parties
to the covenant 14 Another view is that the covenant must be made in connection
with the conveyance of one of the parcels of land.15 A third view is that of sub-
stituted privity, where there is a relation of dominant and servient estates by reason
11. Id. at 212.
12. 122 Mo. App. 282, 292, 99 S.W. 34, 37 (K.C. Ct. App. 1907), quoting from Poage
v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac Ry., supra note 10.
13. Dickey v. Kansas City & I.R.A. Ry., 122 Mo. 223, 26 S.W. 684 (1894);
Ruddick v. St. Louis, K. & N.W. Ry., 116 Mo. 25, 22 S.W. 499 (1893); HOLDIES, THE
CoMMON LAW 404 (1881).
14. State ex rel. Nat'l Subway Co. v. St. Louis, 145 Mo. 551, 46 S.W. 981 (1898)(en banc); State ex rel. Kane v. Johnson, 123 Mo. 43, 27 S.W. 399 (1894); Haley v.
Bagely, 37 Mo. 363 (1866); Vancourt v. Moore, 26 Mo. 92 (1857); Cook v. Tide Water
Associated Oil Co., 281 S.W.2d 415 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955); McCoy v. Wabash Ry., 203
S.W. 249 (K.C. Ct. App. 1918); Winters v. Wabash Ry., 122 Mo. App. 282, 99 S.W. 34(K.C. Ct. App. 1907); Ladd v. Montgomery, 83 Mo. App. 355 (St. L. Ct. App. 1900).
15. Webb v. Russell, 3 T.R. 393, 100 Eng. Rep. 639 (K.B. 1789).
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of an existing easement and the covenant is in aid of the easement.16 In discussing
the privity problem, the three views will be taken up in order.
The first view .consideres the privity requirement fulfilled if a person be a
successor to one of the parties to the covenant, and this would seem to be the Mis-
souri view. Mr. Justice Holmes has stated that this view is the original sound
common law view:
It is a consequence ... of confounding covenants of title, and the class last
discussed, under the name of covenants running with the land. According
to the general view there must be privity of estate between the covenantor
and covenantee in the latter class of cases in order to bind the assigns of the
covenantor. Some have supposed this privity to be tenure; some, an interest
of the covenantee in the land of the covenantor; and so on. The first notion is
false, the second misleading, and the prosition to which they are applied is
unfounded. Privity of estate, as used in connection with covenants at
common law, does not mean tenure or easement; it means succession to a
title. It is never necessary between covenantor and covenantee, or any other
persons, except between the present owner and the original covenantee.
And on principle it is only necessary between them in these cases-such as
warranties, and probably covenants for title-where, the covenants being
regarded wholly from the side of contract, the benefit goes by way of suc-
cession, and not with the land.17
In Withers v. Wabash RV., 18 an early Missouri case, D, a railroad, entered into a
contract with A covenanting that D would build and maintain a ditch along its right
of way for the benefit of A and his heirs, administrators, successors and assigns, if A
would relinquish all claims against D. P purchased a portion of A's land. D did not
maintain the ditch and as a result P's land was damaged. The court said, "I think
that the performance of this covenant in this case, in the events that have occurred,
would always have been beneficial to the owner, and therefore, that it is a covenant
that runs with the land."
The Withers case was cited with approval in McCoy. v. Wabash Ry.' 9 In the
McCoy case, A owned Blackacre and entered into an agreement with R that R would
build and maintain ditches on R's right of way. A sold to P and R to D. P. sued D for
not maintaining the ditches. The court said, "In order to thus enforce a covenant
running with the land it is necessary that it should be alleged in the petition, and
proof should be made showing a privity of estate between the parties to the contract
and the parties to the litigations wherein such enforcement is sought. '20 It would
seem from the above cases that Missouri considers the privity requirement fulfilled
if a person be a successor to one of the parties to the covenant
The second view is that the conveyance of an interest in land must be made at
16. Morse v. Aldrich, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 449 (1837).
17. HoLbIms, THE COLtION LAw 403 (1881).
18. 122 Mo. App. 282, 292, 99 S.W. 34, 36 (K.C. Ct. App. 1907).
19. 203 S.W. 249 (K.C. Ct. App. 1918).
20. Id. at 250; see Vancourt v. Moore, 26 Mo. 92 (1857); Ladd v. Montgomery,
83 Mo. App. 355 (St. L. Ct. App. 1900).
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the time the covenant is made. This view originated in Webb v. Russell,21 an English
case decided in 1789. In this case the real question was whether or not the covenant
was collateral because it was made to-a stranger to the legal title. The covenant was
made to M by T in a lease made by M and E. In holding that such a contract was
collateral, that is, that it did not touch and concern the land, Lord Kenyon stated
"It is not sufficient that a covenant is concerning the land, but, in order to make it
run with the land, there must be a privity of estate between the covenanting parties."
Lord Kenyon then went on to say that M had no interest in the land of which a
court of law could take notice, England following the title theory of mortgages with
legal title in the mortgagee.
Even though this requirement seems to be more in line with the requirement of
mutual relationship hereinafter referred to, nevertheless the case is said to support
the doctrine that there must be a conveyance of an interest in land at the time the
covenant is made.22 This requirement can easily be satisfied by the use of two
conveyances: A owns Blackacre and B owns Whiteacre; A conveys Blackacre to B
and B recoveys Blackacre to A, inserting the desired covenant in the deed.
The third view is that of substituted privity, where there is an existing ease-
ment and thereby an existing relation of dominant and servient estates and the
subsequent covenant is in aid of the easement. This is sometimes called the Mas-
sachusetts view. Under this view there must be a succession to the estate of a party
to the covenant with the superimposed requirement that there must also be a mutual
relationship between the covenanting parties, each of whom must have a simultaneous
interest in the-land of the other. The leading case that is cited for this doctrine is
Morse v. Aldrich.2 3 C conveyed to P's grantor, in fee, a parcel of land, including a
portion of C's mill pond, with liberty of ingress and egress to and from any part of the
described land and water, to dig out and carry away the whole or any part of the
soil. After the conveyance, an agreement was made between C and P, in which C
covenanted that he would, upon P's request, draw off his pond six days in each year,
in the months of August and September, for the purpose of giving P an opportunity
of digging and carrying out mud. C died and his estate descended to D. The court
said, "to create a covenant which will run with the land, it is necessary that there
should be a privity of estate between the covenantor and covenantee."24 This view
has been followed by few jurisdictions, and about the only thing good that can be
said for it that it restricts the number of covenants which run with the land, it being
considered by some that covenants are undesirable encumbrances on the use of land.
In discussing the privity requirement it should be pointed out that. the enforce-
21. 3 T.R. 393, 402, 100 Eng. Rep. 639, 644 (K.B. 1789).
22. Smith v. Kelly, 56 Me. 64 (1868); Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871)
(covenant held unenforceable because there were six days between the conveyance
and the covenant being inserted therein); Lingle Water Users Ass'n v. Occidental
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo. 41, 297 Pac. 385 (1931); CLAax, CovENANrs Runvura WITH
ro L ar (2d ed. 1947).
23. 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 449 (1837).
24. Id. at 453.
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ment of covenants is normally a suit in equity for an injunction rather than an action
at law for damages. Because of this we do not have many cases discussing the privity
requirement since equity does not require privity in order to grant equitable relief.
REMEDIEs AT LAW
Once a covenant enforceable at law has been created, the next problem that is
presented is the effect of-a breach of the covenant. The complainant can maintain an
action at law for damages for the breach. 25 Furthermore the complainant can
maintain an equitable suit for an injunction. 26
Even assuming that the Missouri court will not give equitable relief, nevertheless
an action at law can still be maintained for the breach.27 In fact the Missouri cases
says that the complainant does not lose his action at law for damages just because
equitable relief is denied. 28
Once a covenant has been created by complying with the formal requirements,
then the complainant in Missouri will be able to maintain an action at law for
damages even though the covenant, at the time of the breach, is serving no useful
purpose. However, this is not necessarily so when equitable relief is sought.
CHARLES G. HYmz
DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATIVE
POWER TO OTHER LEGISLATURES
The allegation that an act of Congress is invalid because it amounts to an
unauthorized delegation of legislative power is often made; but it is an allegation
which, though recognized by the federal courts, is seldom held to be a valid reason
for declaring an act unconstitutional.
Prior to Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan' and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States2 the federal courts had never invalidated a congressional enactment on the
basis of unlawful delegation.3 In the Panama and Schechter cases, however, the
25. Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949).
26. Forsee v. Jackson, 192 Mo. App. 408, 182 S.W. 783 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916);
Comment, 23 Mo. L. REV. 214 (1958).
27. Rose v. Houser, 206 S.W.2d 571 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
28. Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian Church, 328 Mo. 1, 40 S.W.2d 545
(1931); Sanders v. Dixon, 114 Mo. App. 229, 89 S.W. 577 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
1. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
2. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
3. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506,
507 (1911). The Grimaud case is perhaps the more outstanding of the two cases to
indicate the reluctancy of the court to invalidate an act on the ground of unlawful
delegation. In this case the Secretary of Agriculture was to regulate the nation's
forest reserves in the interest of conservation. He was to impose regulations "to
improve and protect the forest within the reservation," and insure "favorable
conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of lumber for the use
and necessities of citizens of the United States." Even with such nebulous guides
as these the court held there was no unlawful delegation of legislative authority to
the Secretary.
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Supreme Court held certain phases of the National Industrial Recovery Act void for
the reason that legislative power was granted the President without adequate stand-
ards to guide his actions.
These two decisions, while not expressly overruled, have not been followed and
the federal courts have not since declared a statute invalid because of an unlawful
delegation of legislative power. The doctrine of unlawful delegation is based on
article I, section I of the United States Constitution. This section purports to vest
in the Congress exclusive power to enact federal legislation. Because of this, the
contention arises that certain acts of Congress delegate this legislative power to
others contravening this express provision in the Constitution. The purpose of this
Comment is to discuss recent decisions where it has been alleged that Congress
ignored this constitutional mandate and delegated its power to other legislatures.4
It will be noted in the cases subsequently discussed that in spite of allegations of
unlawful delegation of legislative power to other legislatures the federal courts
rarely find that delegation exists. The congressional action involved is usually distin-
guished from delegation.
In the first two cases discussed, the courts, in holding that delegation did not
exist, relied on the almost exclusive power granted Congress by the commerce
clause to legislate on matters affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,5 Prudential alleged South Carolina's tax
on foreign insurance companies discriminated against interstate commerce in that
no similar tax was levied on domestic companies. In answer it was stated that the
McCarran Act,6 which permitted states to tax insurance companies, cured any defect
that might have existed in the tax.
It was alleged that the McCarran Act was invalid because of the commerce
clause which prohibited the states from regulating interstate commerce, and also on
the ground that the McCarran Act delegated legislative power to the states. The
Supreme Court summarily disposed of the delegation argument and sustained the
validity of the McCarran Act. It held the commerce clause was not a limitation on
the power of Congress over interstate and foreign commerce, and the action of
Congress under it did not amount to delegation.
In Hemans v. United StatesT the court also relied on the commerce clause to
sustain congressional action over the allegation of unlawful delegation. The statute
involved s made it unlawful for anyone to travel in interstate or foreign commerce
4. See Jaffe, Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: 1, 47 COLux. L. REv.
359, 361 (1947) for a discussion of delegation to administrative agencies.
5. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
6. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1952). The pertinent portions of
the act are: ". . . the Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest
and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States."
7. 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1947).
8. Fugitive Felon Act, 1932, ch. 271, § 1, 47 STAT. 326, as amended.
[Val. 24
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with the intent to avoid prosecution or confinement for certain enumerated crimes,
or to avoid giving testimony in any criminal proceedings in a state where the com-
mission of a felony is charged.
Hemans alleged the act was void in that the legislative power of the United
States to make federal crimes was delegated to the states. The court of appeals felt
that no delegation was involved. In so holding it relied on the plenary power granted
by the commerce clause which it felt gave Congress the authority to prohibit travel
in interstate commerce under these conditions. The following statement from Barrow
v. Owen, concerning the act in question, was quoted by the court in the Hemans case:
The statute is certainly not void on its face. Indeed, so viewed, it appears to
be a reasonable exercise of federal authority in aid of enforcement of state
laws. 9
These two cases resulted in a finding by the Supreme Court and the court of
appeals that delegation did not exist, relying on the plenary power granted Congress
by the commerce clause. Acting under this exclusive power, action by Congrss in
regulating interstate commerce is congressional action only and no element of
delegation exists.
Nilva v. United States'0 presents another permissible method of legislation as
distinguished from delegation. In this case convictions were obtained under the
Johnson Act, " which prohibited the interstate shipment of gambling devices, with
the provision that a state, by enacting its own legislation, could exempt itself from
these provisions. The particular section in question reads:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to transportation of any gambling
device to a place in any State which has enacted a law providing for the
exemption of such State from the provisions of this section, or to a place in
any subdivision of a State if the State in which such subdivision is located
has enacted a law providing for the exemption of such subdivision from
the provisions of this section.12
The defendants contended this provision amounted to a delegation of federal
legislative power to the states, and as such was unlawful. No constitutional question
was presented as no state involved had enacted applicable legislation; however, the
court of appeals stated even if such legislation were present no delegation would
be involved:
We think it has been established by controlling authority that Congress may
legislate contingently upon the existence or non-existence of certain facts
which will bring into force the declared policy of Congress.' 3
Gauley Mountain Coal Co. v. Director of United States Bureau ot Mines 1 4
9. 89 F.2d 476, 478 (5th Cir. 1937).
10. 212 F.2d 115 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 825 (1954).
11. 64 STAT. 1134 (1951), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-77 (1952).
12. 64 STAT. 1134 (1951), 15 U.S.C. § 1172 (1952).
13. 212 F.2d at 120.
14. 224 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1955).
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presented the question of whether or not the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act15
resulted in an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the states. The provision
of the act involved in the litigation provided that certain precautions be taken before
electrical equipment could be operated in a "gassy" mine. Whether a mine was or
was not "gassy" was to be determined in accordance with the laws of the particular
state.
The court of appeals held this provision did not amount to delegation, but was
merely the acceptance by Congress of state action as the condition on which their
exercise of power was to become effective. The court stated such legislation was
permissible having been done by Congress in other fields. The court cited several
examples, including the Federal Torts Claims Act.16
The Nilva and Gauley cases show another distinction, that is, conditional legisla-
tion. Conditional legislation results when the statute is enacted by Congress with
its operation contingent on some outside occurrence-in these cases, state action.
As was pointed out, such legislation is not delegation and is a permissible method
of legislating by Congress. Although it was sustained on the basis of being contingent
on action of the states, it is evident that the power of Congress under the commerce
clause was, as in the Prudential and Hemans cases, sufficient to sustain this legislation.
Two distinctions have been made in the preceding cases from the delegation that
was alleged to exist. In the following cases other permissible methods of legislating
were found to be present rather than the delegation alleged to exist.
In United States v. Shurpnack17 the contention was made, as in the Hemans
case, that Congress in enacting the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act I s had delegated
to the states the legislative power of the United States to make federal crimes. The
purpose of this act was to make acts committed on federal enclaves punishable by
the laws of the state in which the enclave was situated, if such crime had not been
made punishable by an act of Congress. Prior assimilative acts had been upheld,' 9
but they were distinguishable from the act in question in that only state laws in
effect at the time of the enactment of the federal act were adopted as federal acts.
The present act provided that the then effective laws of the state were to be deemed
punishable under the Assimilative Crimes Act. Sharpnack was indicted for sodomy
committed within the boundaries of the Randolph Air Force Base in Texas. The
15. 66 STAT. 703, 30 U.S.C. § 479 (1952).
16. 62 STAT. 933 (1949), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1952) ("the district courts
.. . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred"). (Emphasis added.)
17. 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
18. 62 STAT. 686 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
19. Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (1910).
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statute violated was enacted by the state after the enactment of the Assimilative
Crimes Act. This inclusion of subsequently enacted state statutes gave rise to the
allegation of unlawful delegation. The district court was impressed by this contention
and dismissed the indictment against Sharpnack on the ground that Congress may not
assimilate and adopt state statutes enacted subsequent to the Assimilative Crimes Act.
This holding was short lived, however, for the Supreme Court reversed on appeal
holding that there was here no delegation, as the act amounted to a deliberate con-
tinuing adoption by Congress of unpre-empted offenses put in effect by the respec-
tive states for their own government. Two Justices dissented for the reason that
they felt an unlawful delegation was involved. They felt Congress had delegated its
policy making function to the state. The dissenting Justices felt adoption of state
acts would be permissible if the Congress had established the policy and allowed
the state to enact regulations within the policy limits set forth. In this case they
felt, however, that by allowing the states to enact any criminal statute without
guidance was a delegation of legislative power to the states.
The dissenting Justices seem to use the analysis applied where administrative
agencies are concerned. Where an administrative agency is involved it is not
unlawful to allow it to enact regulations within adequate standards that Congress
must set forth. However, unless these standards are adequate the delegation to the
agency becomes unlawful. In view of the decisions in cases where the question of
delegation is thought to be involved it seems remote that the views expressed in the
dissenting opinion will be followed.
The Sharpnack case appears to go farther than most previous cases which have
declined to hold legislation invalid on the ground of unlawful delegation. Although the
act on its face appears to, allow a state to enact what actually amount to federal
crimes, the majority of the court calls this assimilation of the state act "continuing
adoption." Adoption of acts created by other legislatures being a permissible. method
of legislation by the Congress the court finds that in this case no delegation exists.
Wolfe v. Phillips2o also resulted in a holding that no delegation was involved,
although the basis for the holding differs from that in the previous cases. In this
case the federal act in question2 ' provided that the statute of limitations of the State
of Oklahoma was to be applicable, in matters conberning realty, to certain restricted
Indians in the same manner as any other citizen of Oklahoma. It could be pleaded by
any such Indian or the United States or any other party for the benefit of such
Indian to the same extent as though such action were brought by or on behalf of
any other citizen of the State.
The court of appeals concluded this act had as its purpose the granting of the
Indians described the same right to plead the statute of limitations as if such Indian
were a non-Indian citizen of Oklahoma. They felt such purpose could not be achieved
unless later changes in the statutes of limitation were also made applicable. This did
20. 172 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1949).
21. 40 STAT. 606 (1918), as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 355 (1952).
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not amount to adoption of state law as federal law, as all it provided was that the
enumerated Indians were to be subjected to the Oklahoma statute of limitations as
state law. Since the state law was made applicable to the Indians involved in relation
to their transactions involving Oklahoma realty, and not adopted as federal law, no
question of delegation was presented in the case.
In all the previous cases, we have seen that the courts have held, in spite of the
allegations raised, that no delegation actually existed. The remaining cases, while
distinguishable from those concerning delegation to other legislatures, also have the
problem of unlawful delegation presented and make an interesting comparison.
In United States v. Dettra Flag Co.22 legislative power was alleged to have been
delegated to veterans' organizations. The act questioned 23 provided in essence that
reproduction of the insignia or emblem of any veterans' association without such
organization's authorization was an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment. The
district court determined that inasmuch as the veterans' associations were incorpo-
rated by federal permission for the purpose of commemorating the service of some of
the citizens it was proper for Congress to protect the public from frauds and imposters
and to protect the agencies' identification.
The defendant, charged with violation of the act, alleged that the act was void as
unlawfully delegating legislative power. This contention, however, failed as the
-act was held valid. The court held that in view of the many firms that may enter
and leave the industry concerned, and the possible frequent changes that might be
made in. the insignia, it would be unreasonable to expect Congress to be a continuous
fact finding body of these myriad details. Under such circumstances it was reason-
able to allow these agencies to regulate such details within established standards.
Here then the court finds that some degree of authority is granted the veterans'
associations, but, because of the many and varied details that must of necessity be
dealt with, such delegation is the only feasible manner in which the matter could be
controlled. In this case the court seems to apply the analysis used where federal
administrative agencies are involved. By this analysis it is permissible for Congress
to allow the agency to formulate rules and regulations, so long as they stay within
the policy or standards set forth by Congress.24
Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney2 5 presented the question of delegation to
another legislature, but here the allegation was that one federal legislature had
delegated its power to Congress. Questioned here was the Alaska net income tax
law2 6 which incorporated by reference the Internal Revenue Code of the United
22. 86 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
23. 62 STAT. 732 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 705 (1952).
24. Cf. Atherton v. United States, 176 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 938 (1950), where the element of necessity was also a factor in sustaining the
legislation involved.
25. 180 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1950).
26. Alaska Laws 1949, ch. 115, §§ 1-16.
22
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States "'as now in effect or hereafter amended.'" 27 The quoted phrase gave rise to
the contention that the Alaskan legislature had delegated certain of its functions to
Congress, and for this reason the Alaska tax law was void. There was no constitu-
tional question presented in the case because no showing had been made that the
federal act had been changed, but the court of appeals stated that if such question
had been presented the Alaskan law would have been sustained. Their reasons were
that in its effort to conform the Alaskan tax law to the federal law the Alaskan
legislature acted sensibly achieving a result which would simplify the problems of
the taxpayer. With uniformity as the major objective it was the legislature alone
acting and it was not abdicating its functions or making an invalid delegation to
Congress.
There is no doubt that many states have considered adopting the federal income
tax law as their own, but have hesitated doing so because of the fear that a problem
such as arose in the Alaska case would result in invalidating their action. Inasmuch
as the Alaska case involved a federal territory and not a state it is apparent that the
holding in this case does not obviate this fear.
State v. Sims 28 perhaps has no place in this Comment as it concerns the action
of a state legislature and not federal action as in the other cases discussed. It does
have an allegation of unlawful delegation, however, and indicates the action a state
might take in such matters. Involved in the case was an interstate compact whereby
West Virginia and seven other states were to combine efforts to control pollution of
the Ohio River. Control was vested in a commission composed of members of the
involved states and the federal government. The difficulty arose when the West
Virginia auditor refused to allocate state funds for the commission pursuant to a
legislative request. His reason for the denial was that the compact amounted to a
delegation of West Virginia's legislative power to the other states and the federal
government. This position was sustained by the highest court of the state,29 but
the decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court.30
The Supreme Court found the delegation alleged to be involved was merely a
conventional grant of legislative power, the compact being a reasonable and
expedient method of handling the problems that were to be encountered. As such
it was no more than a reasonable and carefully limited authorization for the inter-
state agency to promulgate regulations for the control of pollution.
It is evident that the problem presented in this case differs from the others in
that federal legislation is not involved. Normally, when a state examines its legisla-
tion, its interpretation of its constitution is final and not subject to review by the
federal courts. However, as in this case, where the rights of other states are involved,
27. 180 F.2d at 809.
28. 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
29. State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 134 W. Va. 278, 58 S.E.2d 766 (1950).
30. The case is also interesting in another aspect-the holding of the state court.
Their invalidating the compact on the ground of unlawful delegation indicates that
such result is still possible in a state. Where a federal question is involved, however,
there is as we have seen little chance that the result reached by the state court will
ever be reached by the federal courts.
1959]
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the Supreme Court has the power to review state findings and In this instance
reached a different result than the state court.3 1
While not involving federal legislation the fact that the Supreme Court reached
a different result than the state court seems to add impetus to the prevailing view
that the federal courts are reluctant to invalidate legislation solely on the basis of
an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
In conclusion it would seem that a general statement could be made to the effect
that the possibility of a statute, wherein a federal question is involved, being invali-
dated on the basis of legislative power being delegated to another legislature is
even less than remote. Most of the cases set forth above that present this question
were found not to involve the question of delegation at all. The courts in such
instances found that the statute in question did not delegate legislative power as
alleged. The legislation was distinguished from delegation as being a reasonable
exercise of congressional authority granted by the commerce clause, or that the
statute was either conditional legislation or merely the adoption of a state act as
its own.
Where the court found that some authority was granted it failed to find the
grant unlawful, but sustained it as being necessary under the circumstances or to
obtain the desired result.
Delegation to other legislatures by no means exhausts the field in which allega-
tions of unlawful delegation arise. Contentions are made that legislative power is
illegally delegated to the executive, the judiciary, and, as in the Dettra Flag case,
to independent agencies. In these situations the contention is usually not that it is
unlawful in itself to allow others to promulgate regulations, but that in granting this
authority to those who are to exercise it the standards set forth to limit their actions
are not specific enough, and permit arbitrary discretion to .be exercised.
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to delve into specific situations arising
in these other areas; suffice it to say that the trend in sustaining federal enactments
in these areas is the same. Standards as general as "in his judgment," "in his opinion,"
"unfairly," and "inequitably" have been held by the federal courts to be adequate.
The court in upholding these acts has on occasion held such vague standards ade-
quate because the agency involved had sufficient experience in the field involved
to be adequately regulated by them.32 In other situations the court may look out-
31. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl 3. Generally the Supreme Court does not have
the power to construe the meaning of a state's constitution, however, in the rather
limited area where by compact the rights of other states and the United States are
brought in issue the Supreme Court has the power to review determinations of law
made by the state courts.
32. Sakis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1952). The commission
herein involved was to make classification of securities. Against contentions that
insufficient standards were set forth to enable the commission to classify the
securities the court at page 310 stated:
The Commission has been dealing for many years with classes of stock,
issuance of securities and reorganization of Railroads. It does not seem
unreasonable that Congress in charging this body to determine the number of
classes of stock of a carrier did not elaborate on that phrase.
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side the statute to find the guidance alleged to be lacking,33 or consider the tenor
of the times.3 4
Though the Panama and Schechter cases have not been expressly overruled it
is apparent that they have not been followed. Since they are, at least theoretically,
still law, perhaps the statement that the federal courts will never invalidate an act
solely on the basis of unlawful delegation is unwarranted, but the chances of their
doing so are highly improbable. It is suggested that this is a desirable result. Ques-
tioned in these cases are legislative enactments. Being such their existence is
dependent on Congress allowing them to remain in force. So long as the act
questioned meets other constitutional requirements there is no sound reason for
invalidating it on the ground of unlawful delegation, for if the application of the
act veers away from the course Congress intended, Congress can pass remedial
legislation to achieve the desired end or repeal the act in its entirety.
GUSTAV J. Lzam
JUDICIAL NOTICE IN MISSOURI
I. CASE LAW CONCEPTS
The Missouri sfipreme court has held that "judicial notice is the cognizance of
certain facts which judges and jurors may properly take and act upon without proof
because they already know them."'I At another time the court has quoted the defini-
tion of judicial notice as "but a rule of evidence" 2 which "does away with the formal
necessity for presenting evidence, there being no real necessity for it."' Another
aspect of the rule is that appellate courts will take notice of whatever is admissible,
even if it has been rejected by the trial court.4
33. Meacham Corp. v. United States, 207 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1953). The court in
sustaining the validity of the Shipping Act, 39 STAT. 730 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§ 808 (1952), relied on the preamble to the act to supply adequate standards. It
reads:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to do whatever
may be necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a
merchant marine, and, in so far, as may not be inconsistent with the express
provisions of this Act, the United States Shipping Board shall, in the dis-
position of vessels and shipping property . . . keep always in view this
purpose and object as the primary end to be attained.
34. Atherton v. United States, 176 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
938 (1950). In this case conscientous objectors were assigned to do work of "national
importance." Their contention was that no standard was set out to determine what
such work was to consist of. The court held these words, however, were a sufficient
guide, it being clear that only work necessary to assist in the winning of the war
would be included. They felt that even though the standard was broad it was no
broader than the necessities of the times required.
1. Wolf v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 336 Mo. 746, 762, 81 S.W.2d 323, 332
(1935).
2. Timson v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 598, 119 S.W. 565, 569
(1909) (en bane).
3. Pogue v. Smallen, 285 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo. 1956).
4. Preisler v. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. 1955) (en banc).
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There have been a variety of statements of what the courts will or should
judicially notice in Missouri. The apparent result is that the courts of Missouri may
take judicial notice of all facts which may be regarded as forming that part of the
common knowledge of all people of ordinary understanding and intelligence. Missouri
cases which have enunicated this rule have done so when taking judicial notice of the
following: that elections are important and that voters have an interest in matters
pertaining thereto; 5 that automobiles are used so much in today's transportation that
much more is known by the average citizen about their operation than about the
operation of trains and that courts know familiar facts about the use of them;6 that
horses are no longer as frightened by railroad trains and whistles as in previous years
but that sudden noises of a startling type issuing from behind horses are quite likely
to frighten them;7 that the knowledge of the school child is the measuring stick of
public knowledge and the school child has knowledge of the laws of hygiene which
aver that decomposed matter is detrimental to the public health;8 that a barn because
of its location and construction is rendered more likely to be struck by lightning;9
that customarily there is no hearing of evidence in eminent domain proceedings;o
that the Meramec River has long been a popular fishing stream;" that a highway
contractor was not responsible for the location of a new highway being constructed; 12
that the distance from the center of a Chevrolet automobile and one of its front tires
was about 43 feet; 13 that tractors sometimes turn over when used on embankments. 14
It has been further stated that "courts are not presumed to be ignorant of matters
about which the general public knows";1 5 that "there is no reason why courts should
pretend. to be more-ignorant than the rest of mankind"; 16 that "courts ought not to
proceed on the theory they do not know what everyone else does know";17 that it
should not be necessary to "require a solemn allegation or proof that fishes swim, or
that birds fly."' 8
One of the rules universally followed by the courts of Missouri is that judicial
notice may be taken of things which are beyond the actual knowledge of the
judge, and that the judge, in ascertaining facts to be judicially noticed, may resort to
5. City of St. Louis v. Pope, 334 Mo. 479, 126 S.W.2d 1201 (1939) (en bane).
6. Spoeneman v. Uhri, 332 Mo. 821, 60 S.W.2d 9 (1933).
7. McCleary v. Chicago, B & Q. Ry., 264 S.W. 376 (Mo. 1924).
8. Valley Spring Hog Ranch Co. v. Plagmann, 282 Mo. 1, 220 S.W. 1 (1920) (en
bane).
9. Buhrkuhl v. F.T. O'Dell Constr. Co., 232 Mo. App. 867, 95 S.W.2d 843 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1936), cert. quashed, State ex rel. F.T. O'Dell Co. v. Hostetter, 340 Mo.
1155, 104 S.W.2d 671 (1937).
10. Bowman v. Kansas City, 361 Mo. 14, 233 S.W.2d 26 (1950) (en bane).
11. Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954) (en bane).
12. Slicer v. Menefee Constr. Co., 270 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. 1954).
13. Fisher v. Gunn, 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954).
14. Schwartz v. Kansas City So. Ry., 275 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. 1955).
15. City of St. Louis v. Pope, supra note 5, at 493, 126 S.W.2d at 1210.
16. Kansas City v. Scarritt, 169 Mo. 471, 485 (1902).
17. Henry County v. Salmon, 201 Mo. 136, 161 (1907) (en bane).
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a source of common knowledge he feels would be helpful in refreshing his memory.19
Sources of such knowledge as encyclopedias and dictionaries are referred to.20 The
supreme court has qualified this rule by stating that merely because a fact may' be
proved by reference to dictionaries, encyclopedias, or other publications does not
allow a court to judicially notice it; it must once again pass the test of being common
knowledge.2 1
Many matters of which the law requires courts to take judicial notice are
matters of which in reality the court is ignorant. Although they need not be alleged
or proved, they must be brought to the attention of the court. Some facts of judicial
knowledge are so commonplace that they never leave one's mind; they are an
inherent part of any decision where they apply. However, where the law demands
that a court take judicial notice of a certain fact of which the court is ignorant, the
party desiring such recognition must suggest it to the court.22 "'The court is not
bound to take judicial notice of a fact where it is not called upon to do so either by
counsel or some other facts introduced in evidence and it is one to which the mind
of the court would not ordinarily be directed.' "23 Furthermore, the litigant desiring
that judicial notice be taken of a fact must not only suggest it to the court but should
assist the court in examining proper sources for information concerning the fact.24
In this connection, Wigmore states:
When the judge, pending a decision as to taking judicial notice, seeks
information in order to assist him in reaching that decision, and a parfy
cites in a brief or brings into court for that purpose certain sources of
information, the party so providing them should notify the opponent, in
fairness, so as to give him an opportunity of consulting the same sources
or of producing others.2 5
The Missouri supreme court has stated that "judicial knowledge of facts is
measured by general knowledge of the same facts."26 The court applied this to
the topography and products of Missouri and stated that these facts were generally
known because they were taught in our-schools. Another Missouri court's statement
of this same rule is that "judicial notice can be taken of school history that is
19. Mayes v. Palmer, 206 Mo. 293, 103 S.W. 1140 (1907); Buhrkuhl v. F.T. O'Dell
Constr. Co., supra note 9.
20. Felden v. Horton & Coleman, Inc., 234 Mo. App. 421, 135 S.W.2d 1115 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1939); Buhrkuhl v. F.T. O'Dell Contr. Co., supra note 9.
21. Timson v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 119 S.W. 565 (1909)
(en bane).
22. Corbett v. Terminal Ry. Ass'n, 336 Mo. 972, 82 S.W.2d 97 (1935); Christy v.
Wabash Ry., 195 Mo. App. 232, 191 S.W. 241 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916).
23. 23 C.J. Evidence § 2005, at 172 (1921). See also Corbett v. Terminal Ry.
Ass'n, supra note 22, at 981, 82 S.W.2d at 102.
24. Christy v. Wabash Ry., supra note 22.
25. 9 WIGTORE, EvIDENcE § 2568(b) (3d ed. 1940). See also Corbett v. Terminal
Ry., Ass'n of St. Louis, supra note 22.
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common knowledge for no requirement forces courts to profess an ignorance of
subjects with which all men of ordinary affairs are familiar."'27
Missouri appellate courts will not take notice of the rules of a circuit court that
do not appear in the record. 2 8 But any court may take judicial notice from its own
sessions, adjournments and vacations, 2 9 and the supreme court and the courts of
appeals will take notice of all of their respective records.3 0 For example, in Richards
Brick Co. v. Wright,3 1 the court stated that in certain situations and within certain
limits a court may take judicial notice of its own records in another and different case
than the one being tried. However, in order that a proper record may be assembled
for appeal, the trial court record in the other case must be introduced in evidence
if the evidence therein is essential in connection with the appeal to the establishment
of the cause of the party bearing the burden of proof. This is not necessary if the
opposing counsel admits the contents of the trial court record. In addition, the
supreme court held in State ex rel. Donnell v. Searcy that "we have the power to
notice facts outside the record for the purpose of considering the moot character
of the question before us.,"32
In that area of judicial notice which is based upon the requirement that facts
to be so noticed must be generally known, courts will not take judicial notice of
facts which are not matters of common and general knowledge. 3 For example, the
Springfield Court of Appeals refused to take judicial notice of an alleged fact that
one would be a person of good moral character if he had won a good conduct medal.8 4
The rule governing a court in its determination of whether to take judicial
notice of a fact in a given situation was well stated by the supreme court In City of
St. Louis v. Niehaus as "not a hard and fast one. It is modified by judicial dis-
cretion .... 'Courts are not bound to take judicial notice of matters of fact. Whether
they will do so or not depends on the nature of the subject, the issue involved and
27. Lemasters v. William, 281 S.W.2d 580, 585 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955).
28. Bindley v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 348 Mo. 31, 213 S.W.2d 387 (1948);
State ex rel. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Johnson, 272 S.W. 928 (Mo. 1925) (en banc);
Cusack v. Green, 252 S.W.2d 633 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952); Bowen: v. Mosman, 240 Mo.
App. 1202, 226 S.W.2d 404 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950); Gilpin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo.
App. 566, 132 S.W.2d 686 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939); Pesch v. Boswell, 84 S.W.2d 151 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1935); Patowsky v. Horwitz, 222 Mo. App. 894, 6 S.W.2d 668 (K.C. Ct, App.
1928); E.D. Tyner Constr. Co. v. Schoellkopf, 3 S.W.2d 735 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928); Fox-
Miller Grain Co. v. Stephans, 217 S.W. 994 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920).
29. Robinson v. Walker, 45 Mo. 117 (1869); Bauer v. Cabanne, 11 Mo. App. 114
(St. L. Ct. App. 1881).
30. Lemmon v. Continental Cas. Co., 350 Mo. 1107, 169 S.W.2d 920 (1943); Collins
v. Leahy, 347 Mo. 133, 146 S.W.2d 609 (1941); State ex rel. Horton v. Bourke, 344 Mo.
826, 129 S.W.2d 866 (1939); Siemers v. St. Louis Elec. Terminal Ry., 343 Mo. 1201, 125
S.W.2d 865 (1939); Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 343 Mo. 28, 119 S.W.2d 826
(1938); State ex rel. Union Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 333 Mo.
426, 62 S.W.2d 742 (1933); Bushmann v. Barlow, 321 Mo. 1052, 15 S.W.2d 329 (1929)
(en bane); Bennett v. Metropolis Pub. Co., 148 S.W.2d 109 (St. L. Ct. App. 1941).
31. 231 Mo. App. 946, 82 S.W.2d 274 (St. L. Ct. App. 1935).
32. 347 Mo. 1052, 1059, 152 S.W.2d 8, 10 (1941) (en bane).
33. Morfit v. Thompson, 219 Mo. App. 506, 282 S.W. 113 (St. L. Ct. App. 1926).
34. Hurley v. Hurley, 284 S.W.2d 72 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955).
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the apparent justice of the case.' "35 But it has also been held that the taking of
judicial notice in no manner prevents the opponent from disputing the matter if
he believes it.disputable. As the supreme court stated in Timson v. Manufacturers'
Coal & Coke Co.:
The fact that courts in the first place, and as making out a prima facie case,
will take judicial notice of certain things does not preclude the opposite party
from rebutting such prima facie case; and, if the facts judicially noticed are
disputable, then the party is not, and should not be, prevented from disputing
them, if in fact he can do so.3 6
The court concluded that
if there is any question about the matter of taking judicial notice of a fact,
the doubt should be solved [sic] against the assumption of such fact, and the
parties put upon their proof.3 7
Of course, the effect of judicial notice is that proof is not required of facts of
which the court takes judicial notice. As was stated in Scheufler v. Continental
Life Ins. Co.:
The doctrine of judicial notice originated in the maxim "that what is known
need not be proved" qualified by the further maxim or principle that "it
matters not what is known to the judge, if it is not known to him
judicially."38
As to the effect or weight given to facts judicially noticed, the Missouri supreme
court has stated that such facts are equivalent to evidence.3 9 It has further held
that facts judicially noticed are presented to the court as effectively as they would
be if they were established by proper proof.4 0
The trend of the Missouri courts is definitely to enlarge upon the calendar of
things of which judicial notice will be taken; and, as decisions on judicial notice
continue, the number of things to which judicial notice is given is constantly
increased. 41
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following is a comprehensive listing of the Missouri statutes on judicial
notice. Interpretations of the statutes by the Missouri courts are also enumerated
and explained in the instances where such exist.
35. 236 Mo. 8, 16, 139 S.W. 450, 452 (1911) (en banc). See also Buhrkuhl v. F.T.
O'Dell Constr. Co., 232 Mo. App. 967, 95 S.W.2d 843 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936), cert.
quashed, State ex rel. F.T. O'Dell Constr. Co. v. Hostetter, 340 Mo. 1155, 104 S.W.2d
671 (Mo. 1937).
36. 220 Mo. 580, 598, 119 S.W. 565, 569 (1909) (en banc). See Brock v. American
Cent. Life Ins. Co., 44 S.W.2d 200 (K.C. Ct App. 1931).
37. 220 Mo. at 597, 119 S.W. at 569.
38. 350 Mo. 886, 895, 169 S.W.2d 359, 365 (1943).
39. Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 148 S.W.2d 784 (1941).
40. Mayes v. Palmer, 206 Mo. 293, 103 S.W. 1140 (1907).
41. State v. Missouri Pac. Ry, 212 Mo. 658, 111 S.W. 50 (1908) (en banc).
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Section 71.07042 provides that when provisions have been fulfilled which are
required to change the name of the city, incorporated town, or incorporated village
within this state, all courts of the state of Missouri shall take judicial notice of this
change.
Section 73.020 provides:
When any city or town existing by virtue of the general law of the state, or
by a local or special act, may elect to become a city of the first class, or any
city of the first class shall be incorporated according to law, all courts of
the state shall take judicial notice of the fact of the city being a city of
the first class, and of all steps taken to make it such, and of the corporate
limits thereof.
In Missouri, cities of the first, second, third and fourth class may become a
body corporate and All courts of this state shall judicially notice such reorganization.43
This is also true of sanitary districts under the provisions of chapter 248.44
Under similar statutes regarding cities of the third class the supreme court in
City of Brookfield v. Tooey45 summarily dismissed the defendant's objection that
the complaint was bad because the plaintiff did not aver the class of municipal
corporation to which it belonged. The complaint alleged that the city was a corpora-
tion organized under the general laws of the state and that courts under the
statutes of Missouri had to take judicial notice of the organization of third class
cities, to which the plaintiff belonged. This the court held was correct.
In an action by the Nodaway Valley Bank, the assignee of a judgment against
the defendant, City of Maryville, the bank applied to the circuit court for a writ
of mandamus to levy a tax to obtain funds for payment of the judgment. The court
issued the writ and the city's motion to quash was overruled. On appeal the city
objected that the writ failed to allege that Maryville was an incorporated city that
had the power to levy and collect taxes. The court took judicial notice of powers
and duties of Maryville under the existing law.46
The following cases pertaining to fourth class cities were based upon section
1579 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1889); similar provisions are found in present
day section 79.101.
In the case of City of Clarence v. Patrick47 where defendant was prosecuted
for violation of a city ordinance, the appellate court held that judicial notice would
be taken of the reorganization of cities of the fourth class.
42. All statutory references, unless otherwise indicated, are to RSMo 1949.
43. Sections 74.013, 75.010, 77.010, 79.010, RSMo 1949, apply respectively to cities
of the first, second, third and fourth classes.
44. § 248.050, RSMo 1949.
45. 141 Mo. 619, 43 S.W. 387 (1897); accord, City of Trenton v. Devorss, 70 Mo.
App. 8 (K.C. Ct. App. 1897).
46. Hubbel v. City of Maryville, 85 Mo. App. 165 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900).
47. 54 Mo. App. 462 (St. L. Ct. App. 1893).
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When the defendant was convicted of a nuisance contrary to an ordinance of
the City of Savannah, and objected that there was no allegation or proof of the
incorporation of the city, the court took judicial notice of the fact that Savannah
was a city of the fourth class.4 8
Section 81.030 provides for the taking of a census in fourth class cities, special
charter cities and towns. Among other provisions, it states that after the person
taking the census makes the return under oath and files the return with the city
clerk, all courts of this state shall take judicial notice of the population thereof.
In relation to similar earlier Missouri statutes, Missouri courts have held that the
taking of a census under a section such as this is a fact of which judicial notice will
be taken by the courts, 49 and that such a provision requires the courts to take
judicial notice but attaches no penalty for failing to do so. 50 However, a court was
not required to take judicial notice of a merely colorable census not obtained in a
legal manner and taken for the purpose of defeating a local option law.51
Missouri courts must take judicial notice of the properly extended limits of
cities of 20,000 or less having special charters; 52 of extended city limits of cities
now -containing or which may hereafter contain more than twenty thousand and
less than two hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, organized under special or
local laws,53 and of the extended city limits of constitutional charter cities of over
ten thousand.54
In a suit on taxbills purported to have been issued to the plaintiff by Kansas
City for paving a part of a particular street, the plaintiff stated that the lot involved
was in "West Kansas, now Kansas City, Missouri." The defendant contended that
there had never been any town or city named West Kansas within Jackson County,
that the court would judicially notice that fact and that the words Kansas City
would not cure the defect. The court in its decision stated that it did not believe
there had been any such city but would not judicially notice that there was not
such an addition to Kansas City as West Kansas. It further stated that prior to
February 12, 1859 the city was named "The City of Kansas" and was incorporated
under that name and took judicial notice that part of it was platted as "West
Kansas."55
In Missouri the State Highway Commission, Dental Board, Real Estate Commis-
48. City of Savannah v. Dickey, 33 Mo. App. 522 (K.C. Ct. App. 1889). A similar
holding is found in City of Billings v. Dunnaway, 54 Mo. App. 1 (St. L. Ct. App. 1893).
49. State ex rel. City of Elvins v. Marshall, 183 Mo. App. 593, 167 S.W. 1050 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1914).
50. State v. Jaeger, 157 Mo. App. 328, 138 S.W. 345 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911), aff'd, 240
Mo. 1, 144 S.W. 103 (1912).
51. State ex rel. Ryan v. Wooten, 139 Mo. App. 221, 122 S.W. 1101 (Spr. Ct. App.
1909).
52. § 81.080, RSMo 1957 Supp.
53. § 81.200, RSMo 1949.
54. § 82.090, RSMo 1949.
55. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 136 Mo. App. 642, 119 S.W.
27 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909).
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sion and Public Service Commission are required to have official seals affixed to
all records and other instruments and all courts are required to take judicial notice
of said seals.5 6
In a proceeding in mandamus the relator -was the State Highway Commission
of Missouri. The supreme court took judicial notice of the Constitutional and
statutory provisions which vested the relator with particular powers and duties.67
Section 490.070 to 490.120 relate to judicial notice of certain law other than Mis-
souri law, and may be cited as "The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act."
Section 490.080 provides that all courts of Missouri shall take judicial notice of the
statutes and common law of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the
United States.
In a case interpreting this statute, the supreme court stated:
It is admitted that the injury accrued in Illinois and that the substantive
law of Illinois governs the case. In view of the pleadings and admissions we
are required to take judicial notice of the public statutes and judicial
decisions of that state.58
In another case, although neither the plaintiff nor the defendants made reference
to Kansas law in their pleadings, the petition did allege that the plaintiff's injury
occurred in Kansas. The Kansas City Court of Appeals concluded that the petition
contained allegations sufficient to show that the substantive rights of the litigants
should be governed under the law of Kansas and that it should take judicial notice
thereof.5 9
The supreme court recently held that Illinois law which was relied upon In a
Missouri case need not be pleaded, but that the Missouri courts would take judicial
notice of the law of that state namely that one suing to recover for a negligent injury
occurring therein must, as part of his case, prove that he was exercising ordinary
care for his own safety at the time of the injury. 0
Section 490.090 states that a court may inform itself of laws in a manner that it
deems proper, and that the court may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such
information.
In a case interpreting this statute, the plaintiff had brought a garnishment
56. § 226.100, RSMo 1949 (State Highway Comm'n); § 332.290, RSMo 1949 (Mis-
souri Dental Board); § 339.130, RSMo 1949 (Real Estate Comm'n); § 386.120, (Public
Service Comm'n).
57. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Allison, 296 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1956)
(en banc).
58. McCain v. Sieloff Packing Co., 246 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Mo. 1952); accord,
Wilson v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 291 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. 1956); Conley v. Berberich,
300 S.W.2d 844 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957); Graham v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 260 S.W.2d
846 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953); Hughes Provision Co. v. La Mear Poultry & Egg Co., 242
S.W.2d 285 (St. L. Ct. App. 1951).
59. Bartling v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 275 S.W.2d 618 (K.C. Ct. App. 1955).
60. Redick v. M. B. Thomas Auto Sales, 364 Mo. 1174, 273 S.W.2d 228 (1954).
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proceeding in a Missouri court against the judgment debtor who was a resident of
Nebraska. The circuit court entered judgment allowing an exemption under a
Nebraska statute. The plaintiff complained that the court erred in allowing in
evidence an authenticated copy of an order of a Nebraska district court in an action
where the judgment creditor was not a party, and that therefore the judgment was
not binding on the plaintiff. The St. Louis Court of Appeals held that, though
the judgment was not binding on the plaintiff, the evidence was admissible as a
means of informing the Missouri court of the Nebraska law of exemptions.6 1
Section 490.100 provides that the court shall make the determination of the laws
of every state, territory, and other jurisdictions of the United States and not the
jury, and that, in addition, said determination shall be reviewable.
Section 490.110 states that any party may present any admissible evidence to
the trial court of such laws but that reasonable notice must be given to adverse
parties, either in the pleadings or in some other manner, if a party desires to offer
evidence of the law of another jurisdiction or if he desires judicial notice to be
taken thereof.
Section 490.120 provides:
the law of a jurisdiction other than those referred to in section 490.080 shall
be an issue for the court, but shall not be subject to the foregoing provisions
concerning judicial notice.
Section 490.700 provides:
the courts of this state shall take judicial notice, without proof, of the popula-
tion of all cities in this state according to the last enumeration of the inhabit-
ants thereof, state, federal or municipal, made under or pursuant to any law
of this state or in the United States.
In compliance with this rule, the supreme court has taken judicial notice of the
population of many cities throughout the state.82 Naturally, therefore, it has been
held that judicial notice will be taken of the official records of the census of places
within the court's jurisdiction.6 3
61. Ferneau v. Armour & Co., 303 S.W.2d 161 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957).
62. Kansas City ex rel. Barlow v. Robinson, 322 Mo. 1050, 17 S.W.2d 977 (1929)
(en banc); State ex rel. Moseley v. Lee, 319 Mo. 976, 5 S.W.2d 83 (1928) (judicial
notice that St. Joseph was a city of the first class); Devine v. Wells, 300 Mo. 117, 254
S.W. 65 (1923); Steinbrenner v. City of St. Joseph, 285 Mo. 318, 226 S.W. 890 (1920)
(en banc); State v. McBrien, 265 Mo. 594, 178 S.W. 489 (1915) (judicial notice of the
population of the city of Farmington); State ex rel. Garesche v. Drabelle, 258 Mo.
568, 167 S.W. 1016 (1914) (en banc); State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach, 258 Mo. 541, 167
S.W. 1008 (1914) (en banc) (judicial notice of the population of St. Louis); State
ex rel. Attorney General v. Dolan, 93 Mo. 467, 6 S.W. 366 (1887) (judicial notice that
Kansas City had over 100,000 inhabitants); Noel v. Town of Lees Summit, 166 Mo.
App. 114, 148 S.W. 194 (K.C. Ct. App. 1912) (judicial notice that Lees Summit had
1455 inhabitants); State v. Doe, 150 Mo. App. 185, 129 S.W. 713 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910)
(judicial notice that St. Louis had a population of over 300,000 inhabitants); Russell v.
Poor, 133 Mo. App. 723, 119 S.W. 433 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908) (judicial notice that the
city of Kansas City had less than 300,000 inhabitants at the last taking of the census).
63. State ex rel. Martin v. Wofford, 121 Mo. 61, 25 S.W. 851 (1894).
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In particular, Missouri courts have taken judicial notice of population as follows:
Notice was taken that the city of Caruthersville in the census of 1910 was a county
seat and had a population of 3,655, which made it a city of the third-or fourth class,
duly authorized to pass an impounding ordinance. 64 When violation of a local
option law in Holt County was alleged, the court took judicial notice that there
was no town in Holt county containing 2,500 inhabitants. 5 Judicial notice was
taken of the fact that Potosi was a city which had less than 2,000 inhabitants.60
In 1890 the supreme court announced it would take judicial notice that St. Louis
was the sole city in Missouri with a population of 100,000.07
Interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court of Missouri stated in State ex rel.
Dickason v. Marion County Court:
Under repeated rulings of the supreme court, it should be considered
settled that judicial notice will be taken of the published official census of
the United States, for the purpose of determining the population of cities
of Missouri.6 8
Section 509.220 states:
1. In pleading a private statute or a right derived therefrom, it shall be suffi-
cient to refer to such statute by its title and the place where found in the
"session acts or in the revised statutes, and the court shall thereupon take
judicial notice thereof.
In two old cases the courts construed literally a statute which provided that one
must plead a private statute by referring to its title and the day of its passage, if
the court was to take judicial notice thereof.60 There are no cases interpreting the
present statute but analysis of the interpretations of the older statutes indicates that
the wording of the present-day statute would be closely adhered to. This statute
also provides:
2. In every action or proceeding wherein the pleading states that the law
of another state is relied upon, the courts of this state shall take judicial
notice of the public statutes and judicial decisions of said state.70
Section 536.070 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1957 Supp.) states, in
connection with administrative proceedings:
agencies shall take official notice of all matters of which the courts take
judicial notice. They may also take official notice of technical or scientific
64. Ferry v. Sawyer, 198 Mo. App. 30, 195 S.W. 574 (Spr. Ct. App. 1917).
65. State v. McFadden, 151 Mo. App. 479, 132 S.W. 267 (K.C. Ct. App. 1910).
66. State ex rel. Crow v. Page, 107 Mo. App. 213, 80 S.W. 912 (St. L. Ct. App.
1904).
67. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 13 S.W. 677 (1890);
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Macklin, 13 S.W. 680 (Mo. 1890).
68. 128 Mo. 427, 437, 30 S.W. 103, 104 (1895), affd on rehearing, 128 Mo. 427, 31
S.W. 23 (1895) (en banc); accord, Heather v. City of Palmyra, 311 Mo. 32, 276 S.W.
872 (1925); State ex rel. Major v. Ryan, 232 Mo. 77, 133 S.W. 8 (1910) (en banc).
69. Kirby v. Wabash Ry., 85 Mo. App. 345 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900); Harlan v.
Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry., 18 Mo. App. 483 (K.C. Ct. App. 1885).
70. Cf. §§ 490.070-.120, RSMo 1949.
[Vol. 24
34
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1959], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss1/9
COMMENTS
facts, not judicially cognizable, within their competence, if they notify the
parties, either during a hearing or in writing before a hearing, or before
findings are made after hearing, of the facts of which they propose to take
such notice and give the parties reasonable opportunity to contest such
facts or otherwise show that it would not be proper for the agency to take
such notice of them.
In a proceeding under the workmen's compensation law by a claimant for injuries
sustained while working on the defendant's premises, the St. Louis Court of Appeals
held that evidence was insufficient to sustain the award by the industrial commission.
The court stated:
Respondent further contends that his claim for compensation should be taken
as admitted, under Rule 3 of the industrial commission, for the reason that
appellants' answer was filed more than 15 days after the date of the filing
of the claim for compensation. The rule in question was neither pleaded nor
proved at the hearing before the referee. This court does not take judicial
notice of the rules of administrative agencies. If such rules are to be relied
upon they should be introduced in evidence as any other fact material to
the cause in issue.7 '
E&soN CARTER BorxIq
SECONDARY PICKETING-COMMON AND ROVING SITUS
Picketing is a potent weapon in labor's arsenal of economic pressures and may
be defined as the act of patrolling by one or more persons in connection with a
labor dispute. When picketing takes place at the business location or industrial site
of an employer who is a party to a dispute, it is generally known as primary picket-
ing and is intended to place economic pressure on that employer. Secondary picketing
is closely related to the secondary boycott because the purpose of it is to place
pressure on a person or an employer who is not an immediate party to the labor
dispute in question.
It is the purpose of this paper to explore the effects of secondary picketing and
the attitudes of Congress, the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts
toward it.
A better understanding of the purposes underlying secondary picketing may
be gained by an explanation of its various results. It may inform the general public
of the existence of a labor dispute; induce or encourage the employees of the
picketed employer to stop working; and induce an employer, as a result of work
stoppage, to cease dealing with the employer with whom the union is involved in
a primary labor dispute.
The publication of the dispute to the general public seems to be only incidental,
and inducing the employees to quit work only a step, in the process of putting
71. Nabors v. United Realty Co., 298 S.W.2d 474, 480 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957).
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pressure on the secondary employer to cease dealing with the primary employer
with whom the union is disputing.
Secondary pressure may also be said to be placed on the primary employer when
the union, in picketing the primary employer, coerces the primary employees to
quit work or, in other words, cease doing business with the primary employer with
whom the union has a labor dispute, but this is generally held to be permissible
primary picketing.
The factor which dissociates secondary picketing from primary picketing and
which changes its legal consequences is the very one which makes secondary
picketing related to the secondary boycott. This factor is that secondary picketing
places pressure on a stranger to the original dispute in order to induce him to
cease dealing with the primary employer in the dispute. Some courts have felt that
the presence of this factor makes secondary picketing in itself a secondary boycott.
But, strictly speaking, the term "boycott" refers to a refusal by one person to deal
with another. Pickiting, however, seeks to induce a "boycott." Therefore, a strike
amounts to a boycott whereas picketing is used to induce the strike.
The common. law approach to secondary picketing may be best seen in the
decision of the New York court of appeals in Goldfinger v. Feintuch.1 In this case
the union had a dispute with a kosher meat company. When efforts to obtain a
union agreement from the company proved unsuccessful, the defendant union decided
to picket the non-union-made products at the retail stores, including the plaintiff's
store. The court held, that- the picketing could not be enjoined so long as it was
restricted to the product and not to the retailer as such. The court said:
Within the limits of peaceful picketing, however, picketing may be
carried on not only against the manufacturer but against a non-union product
sold by one in unity of interest with the manufacturer who is in the same
business for profit. Where a manufacturer pays less than union wages both
it and the retailers who sell its products are in a position to undersell
competitors who pay the higher scale, and thus may result in unfair reduction
of the wages of union members. Concededly the defendant union would be
entitled to picket peacefully the plant of the manufacturer. Where the manu-
facturer disposes of the product through retailers in unity of interest with
it, unless the union may follow the product to the place where it is sold
and peacefully ask the public to refrain from purchasing it, the union would
be deprived of a fair and proper means of bringing its plea to the attention
of the public. 2
The reasoning of the court in the Goldfinger case seems to rest on the common
law theory that harm done to another was unlawful unless justified by some interest
recognized at law. It is mow generally accepted that labor has a legal right to take
concerted action in furtherance of its own interest in unionization, collective bar-
gaining, improvement of working conditions and better wages.
1. 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937).
2. Id. at 286, 11 N.E.2d at 913.
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In Weil & Co. v. Doe,3 the sign writer union attempted to picket a furniture store
because the store owner had bought a neon sign which was allegedly the product of
a non-union manufacturer. In granting an injunction against the secondary picket-
ing, the court held that the union's interest in the condition under which the sign
was produced was not extendable so far as to justify the picketing of the person
who purchased the sign. The court felt that there must be some end as to who are
parties to a labor dispute and that in this situation the affinity between the primary
employer (manufacturer of the neon sign) and the furniture store was not direct,
intimate and united sufficiently to allow this secondary picketing.
The "unity of interest" doctrine has had an unmistakable influence in the law
of labor relations. This influence may be seen in section 13(a) -of the Norris-
La Guardia Act 4 and also in those state statutes patterned after the Norris-La
Guardia Act.
In the Norris-La Guardia Act, picketing is made unenjoinable where it occurs
in a case involving a labor dispute as defined in the act. Section 13(a) of the act
provides:
A case shall be held to involve or grow out of a labor dispute when the
case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft,
or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein ...
Thus it may be seen that section 13 (a) protects picketing which occurs in connection
with persons engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation, or have direct
or indirect interests therein. It must be remembered that a large number of states
have anti-injunction statutes which are more or less similar to the Norris-La Guardia
Act and are applicable to their own courts.
The "unity of interest" doctrine has also had an importent influence on the
rule that picketing (as a form of free speech 5) is entitled to constitutional protection
against invasion by state courts or legislatures. This influence may be seen in two
United States Supreme Court decisions involving secondary picketing.
In Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl,6 the union picketed wholesale bakeries
which sold goods to non-union, self-employed peddlers, and retail grocers who
bought from them. The purpose was to compel the peddlers, who had seriously under-
minded union standards, to observe union hours and to hire union relief drivers.
The New York courts enjoined the picketing on the ground that there was no
"labor dispute." The Supreme Court reversed, saying:
A state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circumstances even
peaceful picketing by an individual. But so far as we can tell, respondents'
3. 168 Misc. 211, 5 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
4. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
5. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941);
AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Senn
v. Title Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
6. 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
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mobility and their insulation from the public as middlemen made it practically
impossible for petitioners to make known their legitimate grievances to the
public whose patronage was sustaining the peddler system except by the
means here employed and contemplated; and those means are such as to
have slight, if any, repercussions upon the interest of strangers to the issue.7
On the same day that it handed down the decision in the Wohl case, the Supreme
Court handed down the decision in Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe.S Ritter had
made a contract with a non-union building contractor to erect a building. The
Carpenters Union sought to get Ritter to compel the contractor to employ union
labor by picketing a restaurant which Ritter owned and operated quite separate
from the new building site and some two miles distant. Texas enjoined the picketing
as a violation of its antitrust laws. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
held that this injunction did not violate the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
The Court pointed out that it will not allow an extension of the consitutional protec-
tion of freedom of speech to allow the Carpenters Union to picket neutrals having
no relation to either the dispute or the industry in which it arose.9
As can be seen from the above cases, the basic question is whether or not the
person secondarily picketed has an interest in the dispute to justify conscripting
him through picketing. Also, it may be inferred from these two cases that the
"industry, trade, craft, or occupation," categories of section 13(a) of the Norris-La
Guardia Act define-the area -within which the secondary picketing may not be
prohibited but outside of which picketing is not constitutionally protected.
At this point it is well to consider the effect of section 8(b) (4) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.10 Under that section it is an unfair labor practice
for a union to "induce or encourage" the employees of any employer to engage in
a "concerted refusal" to perform services where "an object thereof" is:
1. To force or require any employer or self-employed person to join any labor
or employer organization.
2. To force or require any employer or other person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person.
3. To force or require any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization
has been certified as the representative of such employees.
4. To force or require any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular
labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organiza-
tion has been certified as the representative of such employees.
7. Id. at 775.
8. 315 U.S. 772 (1942).
9. Id. at 726.
10. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952), hereinafter
referred to as "the act."
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5. To force or require an employer to assign work to employees in one labor
organization, trade, craft, or class rather than to another, unless the employer is
failing to conform to an order or certification of the National Labor Relations Board
determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work.
One of the salient purposes of all picketing is to induce employees and the public
to take sides with the persons who are picketing." What is true of all other types
of picketing would seem to be also true of secondary picketing. Secondary picketing,
then, comes within section 8(b) (4) as action which will induce or encourage em-
ployees to engage in a concerted refusal to perform services if the object of the
picketing is one of the above five unlawful objects. If secondary picketing comes
within 8<b) (4), it follows that it is an unfair labor practice where it has any of the
above five objects. The problem now presented is: since the Wohl case declares that
secondary picketing was protected as a form of free speech where there is a unity
of interest between the secondary and primary employers, what does 8(b) (4) do to
this protection? It would seem that the very acts done by the union in the Wohl
case, which the Supreme Court held to be constitutionally protected, would come
almost perfectly within the terms of 8(b) (4) (A).
This constitutional question was decided in International Bhd. of Elec. Workers
v. NLRB,12 where the Supreme Court, in rejecting the contention that application
of section 8(b) (4) sanctions to secondary picketing would infringe upon the con-
stitutional right of free speech, said:
The prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secondary pressure by
§ 8(b) (4) (A) carries no unconstitutional abridgment of free speech. The
inducement or encouragement in the instant case took the form of picket-
ing followed by a telephone call emphasizing its purpose. The constitutionality
of § 8(b) (4) (A) is here questioned only as its possible relation to the free-
dom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. This provision has been
sustained by several Courts of Appeals. [Citing cases.] The substantive evil
condemned by Congress in § 8(b) (4) is the secondary boycott and we
recently have recognized the constitutional right of states to proscribe picket-
ing in the furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives. [Citing case.]
There is no reason why Congress may not do likewise. 13
The question of the legality of secondary picketing under 8(b) (4) of the act
frequently arises in connection with two other types of picketing, namely, common-
premises picketing and roving-situs picketing. Common-premises or common-situs
picketing occurs where a labor organization pickets premises where the employees
of two or more employers are working and the labor organization has a dispute with
only one of the employers. Roving-situs picketing occurs when a labor organization
which has a primary dispute with one employer pickets the premises of another
employer when the employees of the first employer are temporarily present.
11. International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL, 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949).
12. 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
13. Id. at 705.
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As seen above, section 8(b) (4) (A) of the act makes it an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents to induce or encourage employees to strike
against or refuse to perform services for their employer where an object is to force
him to cease doing business with another employer who has been struck. The
purpose of this section of the act is to protect innocent third persons from economic
loss as a result of a labor dispute in which they have no concern. 14 The aim of the
section is to outlaw secondary boycotts while at the same time permitting a union
to take appropriate concerted action against a primary employer whose employees
the union represents for collective bargaining purposes.15
Senator Taft, who was the sponsor of the bill in the Senate and Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in charge of the bill, said, in
discussing section 8 (b) (4) to show that the bill was aimed at secondary and not
primary action:
This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure
the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement
between the employer and his employees ... [Under] the provisions of the
Norris-La Guardia Act, it became impossible to stop a secondary boycott or
any other kind of strike, no matter how unlawful it may have been at common
law. All this provision of the bill does is to reverse the effect of the law as
to secondary boycotts.16 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it-can be seen that the-sponsor of the bill believed section 8(b) (4) (A) to be
aimed at secondary and not primary action.
The courts, as wel as the NLRB, have not been consistent in applying this
section in cases appearing before them. A view of some of these cases may be helpful
in ascertaining some of the tests used to determine if the picketing is or is not a
violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A).
Pure OiL17 was a case involving a common situs picketing situation. Pure Oil
and Standard Oil operated adjacent oil refineries near Toledo, Ohio. Pure Oil main-
tained a pipeline from its refinery through Standard's refinery to a dock, operated by
Standard on the Maumee River some three miles from the refineries, where Standard
employees loaded the oil aboard waiting ships. A strike at Standard resulted in the
picketing at Standard's plant and at the dock. Pure Oil employees refused to cross
the picket line to load the oil aboard the ships and the National Maritime Union
refused to handle the cargo when Pure Oil supervisers attempted to load the
vessels from Standard's dock.
The NLRB held the union activity to be permissive and primary since the
picketing was confined to the immediate vicinity of Standard's premises.
14. NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, AFL, 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950).
15. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., Inc., 341 U.S. 665 (1951). See also
93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947); 93 CONG.
REC. 3838 (1947).
16. 93 CoNG. Rsc. 4198 (1947).
17. Oil Workers Int'l Union, CIO, 84 N.L.RB. 315 (1949).
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In refuting the contention of the general counsel that the picketing at the dock
was unlawful because it induced the employees of Pure Oil to engage in a concerted
refusal to handle Pure Oil products at the dock, in order to force Pure Oil to
cease doing business with Standard Oil the Board said:
A strike, by its very nature, inconveniences those who customarily do
business with the struck employer. Moreover, any accompanying picketing
of the employer's premises is necessarily designed to induce and encourage
third persons to cease doing business with the picketed employer. It does
not follow, however, that such picketing is therefore proscribed by Section
8(b) (4) (A) of the act.'8
In Ryan,1 9 the NLRB again had a common situs picketing problem. The Ryan
Construction Company was erecting an addition on the Evansville Bucyrus Plant.
Bucyrus employees customarily used the main gate for purposes of ingress and
egress although there were several other gates in the fence surrounding the plant.
To facilitate construction operations, Ryan Consturction made a gate in the fence
some five-hundred feet from the main gate for use by its employees. Bucyrus em-
ployees, upon the outbreak of a strike, picketed the Ryan gate as well as the main
gate with the result that Ryan employees refused to cross the picket line. The Board
held that this picketing at the Ryan gate did not enlarge the area of the dispute
and did not violate section 8(b) (4) (A). The Board realized that the picketing had
a secondary effect as in the Pure Oil case, but stated:
... [W]hen picketing is wholly at the premises of the employer with whom
the union is engaged in a labor dispute, it cannot be called secondary even
though, as is virtually always the case, an object of the picketing is to
dissuade all persons from entering such premises for business reasons.20
The Board also noted that Bucyrus employees could have used the Ryan gate
had they chosen to. It is interesting to note that the wording on the signs at the
Ryan gate was the same as on those carried by pickets at the main gate. The Board
felt, however, that the signs were directed at Bucyrus when they read, "On Strike;
No contract, no shovel; On strike for security and decent wages."
Picketing of an "ambulatory" or "roving" situs was involved in Schultz
Refrigerated Service 2 ' in which the union was striking against Schultz, Inc., a
trucking company with its terminal in Slackwood, New Jersey. Schultz, however,
continued to operate its transportation business in New York City and for that
purpose, hired employees of a New Jersey local to perform the driving duties in
New York City previously performed by the striking employees. Picketing occurred
at secondary premises when Schultz's trucks were at the premises. This picketing
consisted of the striking employees walking around Schultz's trucks, announcing by
18. Id. at 318.
19. United Elec. Workers, 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949). The union involved in this
case, the UIE, was expelled from the CIO in 1949 on the ground that it was Com-
munist dominated.
20. Id. at 418.
21. International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL, 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949).
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means of printed signs that members of the striking union had been locked out of
their jobs by Schultz. The Board held that where the location of the employee's
duties is different than that of the employer's premises, the former will be a proper
situs for a primary union ictivity and that the picketing under the above circum-"
stances was within primary bounds.
The Board in this case said that the identification of such picketing with the
actual functioning of the primary employer's business at the situs of a labor dispute
was an important test in determining the lawfulness of the picketing.22
'Much the same situation was presented in Sterling Beverages23 as was presented
in the Schultz case, above, but here the picketing of a secondary employer's premises
took place prior to the arrival of the primary employer's trucks and continued after
their departure. The Board held this to be unlawful secondary picketing since the
union failed to confine its picketing to times when the trucks of the primary em-
ployer were physically present at the secondary employer's premises. The Board also
said that picketing of the secondary employer's premises when Sterling trucks were
not physically present failed to establish that direct and immediate relationship
between the picketing and the object picketed necessary to a finding of purely
primary picketing.
As seen from these two cases, roving situs picketing must be limited to the
times that the primary employer's trucks are physically present at the premises of
the secondary employer and the picketing should be limited to the immediate area
of the- trucks.
In 1950, the Board set down certain definite conditions that must be met before
picketing of a secondary employer's premises would be regarded as permissive
primary action. The Board stated in Moore Dry Dock: 24
.. . [P]icketing of the premises of a secondary employer is -primary if it
meets the following conditions: (a) The picketing is strictly limited -to times
when the situs of dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises;
(b) at the.time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its
normal business at the situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably
close to the location of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that
the dispute is with the primary employer.2 5
The case arose from an attempt by the Sailors' Union to negotiate an hours,
pay and working conditions agreement with the owners of the S.S. Phopho, at a
time when the vessel was undergoing repairs at the Moore Company's drydock.
When contract negotiations failed, the union requested Moore's permission to picket
within the premises, alongside the pier where the vessel was berthed. Moore refused,
and the union thereupon picketed at the company's gate. The Board held that the
22. Id. at 505.
23. International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL, 90 N.L.R.B. 401 (1950).
24. Sailors' Union, AFL, 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
25. Id. at 549.
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union's activitics met the quoted conditions and was therefore permissive. The
owners of the Phopho had no permanent location where picketing could take place.2 6
These Moore Dry Dock standards were applied by the Board until 1953 when
the Board refused to apply them where the primary employer maintained a "prin-
cipal plant" in the community as in the Washington Coca Cola2 7 case. There the Board
held that where a primary employer maintains a principal plant in the community
serviced by delivery trucks, picketing was to be restricted to the main plant area,
and that picketing of trucks of primary employer while parked at retail stores
constituted illegal secondary activity. The Board seemed to believe that where a
"principal plant" provided adequate opportunity for effective exercise of concerted
efforts by the union, the Board would refuse to permit picketing of business
activities of the primary employer at the premises of the neutral employer.
The Schultz case was distinguished on the basis that there was no permanent
establishment where the Schultz trucks could be picketed within the state in which
the labor dispute arose. The Moore Dry Dock case was also distinguished on the
basis that the owners of the Phopho maintained no permanent establishment which
the union could effectively picket
The factors given much weight by the Board in the Washington Coca Cola case
were that the Coca Cola Company maintained a principal plant in downtown Wash-
ington; the drivers entered and left the plant approximately four times daily; the
principal plant had been picketed since the beginning of the strike; and the roving
pickets had, on at least one occasion, picketed in front of a retail store entrance
which was used exclusively for deliveries. 28
In a 1954 case, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,2 9 the Board refused to apply the
"principal plant" doctrine because it was felt that the common premises (a con-
struction site) was the situs of the dispute. Here, the workers being picketed at
the construction site were at the "principal plant" or main business establishment
of the primary employer only twice daily, for reporting to work and checking out.
Sometimes the workers did not report to the main establishment at all but reported
at the construction site where they worked all day. It was pointed out that this
common situs picketing was the only way the union could effectively reach the
primary employees since the main establishment of the primary employer was
located two and one-half miles from the center of town and union picketing had
taken place there for only a short time during the strike. Thus, it can be seen that
the factual situation here differed from that presented in the Washington Coca Cola
26. See Piezonki v. NLRB, 219 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Teamsters
Union, 212 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Local 55, Carpenters Dist. Council,
AFL, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs Union,
AFL, 191 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1951), enforcement granted, 199 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1952).
27. Brewery Drivers, AFL, 107 N.L.R.B. 229 (1953), enforcement granted, 220
F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
28. Cf. Bakery Drivers Union, AFL, 100 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1952). But see Crowley's
Milk Co., Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 996, enforced, 208 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1953).
29. Brotherhood of Painters, AFL, 110 N.L.R.B. 455 (1954).
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case. A prior decision in the Otis MasseV30 case was believed not to be in conflict
because there it was held that the construction site did not harbor the situs of the
dispute, whereas in the present case the Board felt that the construction site did
harbor the situs of the dispute.
The pickets did not make it clear from the placards carried that the dispute
was with the Pittsburgh Plate Glass only and not the neutral employers at the
construction site. This was held to be a violation of the fourth requirement of the
Moore Dry Dock case.
In a 1954 decision involving roving situs picketing, Thurston Motor Lines,31
the union, having a dispute with Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., followed Thurston's
trucks to pick up and delivery points and picketed the trucks at these places.
Picketing at the premises of secondary employers took place only at times when
Thurston's trucks were present and was limited to appropriate places. The placards
carried by the pickets as they patrolled around the trucks clearly disclosed that the
dispute was with Thurston. The pickets orally induced the secondary employees not
to handle Thurston's goods and this activity was held to be in violation of 8 (b) (4) (A).
The Board affirmed the finding of the trial examiner that the tests of the Moore
Dry Dock case were to be used only in situations where it has been found that the
situs of the dispute is at the premises of the secondary employer, and where the
primary employer has a permanent place of business in the locality which can be
picketed by the union then the "principal plant" doctrine is applicable. The Board
made note of the fact that the union had picketed the two Thurston terminals since
the beginning of the dispute.
After the reversal of the Board's decision in the Otis Massey case, by the fifth
circuit court of appeals, the Board had another chance to gain approval of its
Washington Coca Cola "principal plant" doctrine when the Campbell Coal8 2 case
went to the District of Columbia court of appeals. The Campbell Coal Company, a
ready-mix concrete manufacturer who sold at its plants and delivered to buyers at
construction sites, discharged several union truck drivers. The union then initiated a
strike against the employer and picketed the employer's plants. The pickets also
followed some of the employer's trucks to the construction sites, picketing where
the deliveries were made. The NLRB found this picketing to be a violation of
8(b) (4) (A) and based its decision solely on the Washington Coca Cola and Thurston
Motor Lines cases.3 3
The union repeated the argument used before the Board that it had complied
30. General Drivers, AFL, 109 N.L.R.B. 275 (1954), enforcement denied, 350 U.S.
914 (1955). The case is discussed in 31 NOTRE DAzME LAw 317 (1956).
31. Albert Evans, Trustee of Local 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL, 110
N.L.R.B. 748 (1954).
32. Sales Drivers Union, AFL, 110 N.L.R.B. 2192 (1954), enforcement denied,
229 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956), supplemental decision,
116 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1956), enforced, 249 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 958 (1958).
33. 110 N.L.RMB. at 2194.
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with the Moore Dry Dock tests, stating further that the Board had added another
requirement or "fifth test" that no situs for effective picketing other than the com-
mon one be available. The court agreed, pointing out that in the Moore Dry Dock
case it was a fact that no such separate situs was available but the Board's decision
did not specify this as one of the conditions of lawful picketing at a common situs. 34
As to its own affirmation of the Washington Coca Cola decision, the court stated
that it only agreed with the decision which the Board reached there, which rested
in part upon additional findings. It did not thereby approve of the rule relied on
by the Board in the instant Campbell Coal case.
The court also said that the existence of a common site, at which picketing will
have only an incidental effect upon the employees of another employer, and whether
there is another place which can be picketed are factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether a violation of 8(b) (4) (A) has occurred. Standing alone, this
situation does not constitute a violation. There must be other evidence to overcome
section 13 of the act, which preserves the right to strike except as specifically
provided in other sections of the act. Said the court of appeals, "No rigid rule which
would make these few factors conclusive is contained in or deducible from the
statute."35 The court remanded the case to the Board for further consideration.
The Board reconsidered the case and issued a supplemental decision and order.3 6
It is to be remembered that the court had said in its original decision that the
single factor that the primary employer had plants where the union could picket
did not, standing alone, make common situs picketing a violation. The court, upon
hearing argument as to whether the supplemental order should be enforced, upheld
the Board and said that if an object of the picketing, although not the sole object,
was proscribed by 8(b) (4) (A) then the picketing was unlawful. 7 The combination
of circumstances could be considered by the Board in determining whether an
object of the picketing came within the objects condemned by the secondary boycott
section of the act. Also, the union must take affirmative action and inform the
neutral employees that the picket line was not aimed at the neutral employer even
though it seems that fact was plain from the placards. Facts of the case revealed
that picketing only occurred at a common situs when the union's verbal request
to the neutral employer not to accept delivery from the primary employer was
refused. This is an additional factor which the court said may be considered by
the Board.
Thus it may be seen that from the time of the original hearing on the Campbell
Coal case until it's final determination, the Board and the District of Columbia
court of appeals have changed in their approach to the common or roving situs cases
and have seemingly developed a new criteria to be used to determine the legality
of this secondary picketing.
34. 229 F.2d at 516.
35. 229 F.2d at 517.
36. 116 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1956).




et al.: Editorial Board/Comments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1959
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
It is interesting to note that, as we have seen in this Comment, it was or is
common understanding that picketing is meant to encourage others to take sides
in a labor dispute. We shall examine this later on.
The original decision in the Campbell case seemed to deal a severe body blow to
the Board's Washington Coca Cola rule. The Board, however, has doggedly held on
to the doctrine but has *placed the illegality of secondary picketing on alternate
grounds in some of its subsequent decisions. The Board's decisions in Southwestern
Motor Transport Co.,38 W. H. Arthur Co.,3 9 and Ready Mixed Concrete Co.,4
o all
involved the "fifth rule" or "principal plant" doctrine together with other evidence
tending to show union actions violative of section 8(b) (4) (A).
The Board gave notice of its firm stand on its Washington Coca Cola rule when it
decided Southwestern Motor Transport Co. Much time was given by the Board in
writing its decision in fully explaining its stand and reasons therefore. In applying
section 8(b) (4) (A) the B6ard said it had attempted to strike a balance between "the
dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring
pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding
unoffending employers and others from pressures and controversies not their own."
41
Thus, picketing at the situs of the primary employer's operations is not prohibited
by section 8 (b) (4) (A) when objectives of Congress are put into balance. Picketing
at the situs- of some other employer's operations, as a general rule, does come within,
the prohibition. The reason for this is the picketing at a place where none of the
employees -of the primary employers are working must necessarily4 2 be directed
only at the employees of some other employer. There are however certain situations,
as in Schultz and Moore Dry Dock, in which the Board permits an exception to the
general rule by allowing the union to picket at the premises of a secondary em-
ployer. This exception is for the sake of effectuating the congressional intent. The
union must comply with the conditions of Moore Dry Dock and the reason is that
it must minimize the adverse effect of the picketing on the neutral employer. But
even after the union has complied with all the conditions, it is entitled only to a
rebuttable presumption that it is seeking to appeal only to the employees of the
primary employer.
The Board then justified its Washington Coca Cola case by saying that if a
union can reach the employees of the primary employer at the primary employer's
premises, then it cannot accomplish more by appealing to those same employees
again at a secondary employer's premises. In that situation the only reasonable
inference is that the picketing is directed at the employees of the secondary employer.
And of the reversal of their holding in the Campbell Coal case the Board said:
38. Local 657, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 115 N.L.R.B. 981 (1956).
39. Sheet Metal Workers, 115 N.L.R.B. 1137 (1956).
40. International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 116 N.L.R.B. 461 (1956).
41. -NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, supra note 37, at 692.
42. 115 N.L.R.B. at 983.
[Vol. 24
46
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1959], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss1/9
[W]ith all due respect for the opinion of the court of appeals in the Campbell
Coal case, we do not adopt the conclusion of that court that the type of
picketing involved therein is not unlawful.43
A very interesting decision was delivered by the NLRB in Retail Fruit Dealers. 44
Retail Clerks Local 648 had a dispute with J. M. Long and Co., owner of Crystal
Palace Market. The Long Co. operated only four of the sixty-four stands or shops in
the market and leased out the others to independent contractors. When the union
picketed members of the grocers' association, to which some of Long's shops were
connected, Long closed down those shops. Other of Long's shops remained open as
did the leased shops in the market. Long gave the union permission to come inside
the market, if it so desired, and picket the stands involved in the labor dispute; that
is, the stands that had been closed down. The union, instead, remained outside and
picketed the entire market. After rejecting the union's contention that the lessees
were allies of Long, the Board proceeded to the common situs picketing problem.
The main opinion begins by stating that if the Moore Dry Dock standards are
observed, common situs picketing is lawful and any incidental impact on neutral
employees at the common situs will not render it unlawful. The "controlling con-
sideration" in the development of these standards has been to require that the
picketing be conducted so as to minimize its impact on neutral employees insofar
as this can be done without substantial impairment of the effectiveness of the
picketing in reaching the primary employees. 45 The Board also stated in the decision
that the union must make a "bona fide" effort to minimize the harmful effect of
the picketing on the operations of neutral employers:
We believe . . . that the foregoing principles should apply to all common
situs picketing, including cases where, as here, the picketed premises are
owned by the primary employer. We can see no logical reason why the
legality of such picketing should depend on title to property. The impact on
neutral employees of picketing which deviates from the standards outlined
above is the same whether the common premises are owned by their own
employer or by the primary employer.46
The above quotation is a change of view from the Board's earlier decisions in
the Ryan and Pure Oil cases. The Board has now added a "bona fide" rule to the
requirements of legal common or roving situs picketing. This rule may possibly be
a further step by the Board as shown in the Southwestern Motor Transport case,
that a union only gains a rebuttable presumption of legality by compliance with
the Moore Dry Dock rules. Thus the rules set out by the Board in the primary
premises situations have been changed to further limit the permissible scope of
union activity.
43. Id. at 985 n.11.
44. Local 1017,. Retail Clerks' Union, AFL-CIO, 116 N.L.R.B. 856 (1956).
45. Id. at 859.
46. Ibid. Cf. NLRB v. Deena Axtware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953); United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc.,
198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952); Local 55, Carpenters,
AFL, 108 N.L.R.B. 363 (1954), enforcement granted, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954).
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The Board scored a victory for its Washington Coca Cola doctrine when the first
circuit court of appeals affirmed the Board's decision in the Barry Controls 47 case.
There the union was the certified bargaining representative of a unit of workers
employed by the company. The union called a strike and picketed the employer's
plant. In addition, union pickets followed one of the non-striking truck drivers and
picketed the truck at stops made for picking up supplies and making deliveries.
The Board followed its prior decisions of Washington Coca Cola and Southwest-
ern Motor Transport cases and made it clear that it did not rely on the conclusion
of the trial examiner that the picketing on neutral employer's premises was to be
tested by the rules of Moore Dry Dock.4 8 The court of appeals agreed with the Board
in its holding that the Moore Dry Dock doctrine has no application in this case,
pointing out that here, all employees in the bargaining unit were continuously em-
ployed at Barry's plant except for the driver, Yorke, and he had to cross the picket
line at the plant on his way to and from work plus, in the course of driving the
pick-up and delivery truck, crossing the picket line once or twice a day.
Thus by picketing the premises of the primary employer, Barry, alone, the
Union had a fully adequate opportunity to publicize its labor dispute to the
members of the bargaining unit generally and also to exert individual
pressure on Yorke by embarrassing him into either joining the strike or
quitting his job. Certainly from these facts it was logical and reasonable for
the Board to draw the friference that the Trni6n's picketing of Yorke's truck
at the premises of secondary employers must have been designed, in part
at least, to encourage those employers to cease doing business with Barry, or
ta induce their- employees not to handle- or transport Barry's freight.49
The court pointed out that causing other employers, or their employees, to
cease doing business with the primary employer need not be the sole object of the
picketing on the secondary employer's premises to make the picketing illegal. It
is enough if that result is an object of the activity.5 0 Thus, it may be noticed that the
Board is applying the Washington Coca Cola doctrine to cases where there is a
principal plant but the court here did not make it as automatic a rule as does the
Board. The court seems to look to all the facts before affirming the Board and has
- found sufficient facts to show that an object of the union was violative of 8 (b) (4) (A).
The Board has continued to apply the Washington Coca Cola doctrine along with
its added "an object" test in ifs recent decisions.5 1 Thus the rigid rule of Washington
Coca Cola is still applied with possibly greater sweep than it was originally. The
47. United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO, 116 N.L.R.B. 1470 (1956), enforced, 250
F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1957).
48. Id. at 1470.
49. 250 F.2d at 187.
50. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). Also, it is not
required that this object be attained. See NLRB v. Associated Musicians, 226 F.2d
900 (2d. Cir. 1955).
51. Local 117, United Glass Workers, AFL-CIO, 117 N.L.R.B. 622 (1957); Gen-
eral Truck Drivers, 117 N.L.R.B. 885 (1957), enforced, 252 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 931 (1958); Teamsters Union, 117 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1957).
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addition of the "an object" test has allowed the Board to find the union's common
situs picketing illegal activity if the factual situation demands. The line of cases
shows a definite trend of the Board and of some of the enforcing courts to limit
the scope of permissible union activity as much as possible in order to satisfy the
present conception of the balance of interest between the union and secondary
employers.
To illustrate the extent to which the Board is now willing to go in order to find
common situs picketing illegal by application of the "an object" test is its decision in
Incorporated Oil.52 There the union, having a dispute with the company, called a
strike in 1953 and picketed the fourteen gasoline stations operated by the company
in St. Louis. All the stations were picketed during the first year of the strike. In
1954 the union began picketing the stations by a roving team of pickets, moving
from station to station so that all fourteen stations were picketed from time to time.
In March of 1955 the company decided to rebuild one of its stations located on
Manchester Road,53 and engaged Drury, an independent union contractor to do
the work. The job progressed to the point where the old station was torn down and a
temporary building constructed when the roving team of pickets arrived at the
Manchester station and commenced to picket the premises. This had the effect
of inducing Drury's employees to cease work. The filling station was later closed
down with all company signs removed and the union then ceased picketing at this
station. No further work was attempted by Drury for several weeks. Then, with the
station still closed down and no primary employees present at the Manchester station,
Drury employees returned to work on August 8, 1955. Three hours later the
picketing was resumed with the result that Drury's employees ceased work and
refused to cross the picket line. The Board found an 8 (b) (4) (A) violation on the
basis that the picketing on August 8, 1955 induced Drury employees to cease work
and that an object of the inducement was to compell Drury to cease doing business
'with the company. Much weight was given to the fact that no primary employees
were present when this later picketing took place and the only persons present at
the primary premises were the secondary employees.
In refusing to enforce the order of the Board in this case, the eighth circuit
court of appeals said the "an object" test is proper in cases where the picketing
involved was not lawful primary picketing. 54 The court felt that the picketing of
the primary employer's premises had been lawful before the arrival of Drury
employees and remained lawful after they began to work on the primary employer's
premises. In holding that this activity on the part of the union was lawful primary
picketing the court relied on the prior Board decisions in the Pure Oil and Ryan cases.
The court further stated that the "an object" test was too narrow in this case
52. Local 618, Automotive Employees Union, AFL-CIO, 116 N.L.R.B. 1844 (1956),
enforcement denied, 249 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1957).
53. This station was some two and one-half miles from the site of the nearest
other station.
54. 249 F.2d at 334.
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where the picketing took place entirely at the premises of the primary employer.
To find this primary premises picketing unlawful as violative of 8(b) (4) (A) the
Board must show evidentiary support for a conclusion that the primary picketing
serves no lawful purpose.5 5 Thus the "an object" test has been denied the approval
of at least one court in a primary site picketing situation.
CONCLUSION
Until the United States Supreme Court speaks more directly on the legislative
intent of section 8 (b) (4) (A) with reference to common and roving situs situations,
no final solution seems presently possible. The approaches to the problem have been
varied within the Board and with the federal courts. The "an unlawful object" test
as compared with the rule-making of the Board are not easily reconcilable but it
may be done in time. The rigid rule application of the Board in varied factual situa-
tions has been for the most part viewed with disfavor by the courts. The reason for
this would seem to be that the courts have realized that the Board has occasionally
lost view of its purpose as an expert agency. In cases involving alleged unlawful
secondary picketing the purpose of the Board is to determine, as a board of experts,
if the union has in fact engaged in activity proscribed by section 8(b) (4) (A), keep-
ing in mind the dual congressional objectives. By applying rigid rules the Board
is denying to itself the use of expert determination.
At present the following can be said of the Board:
1. The Board has shown that it does not intend to apply the primary situs
doctrine of Ryan Construction with any degree of finality but will look to all the
related union activity in a primary picketing situation.
2. The standards of the Moore Dry Dock case are still applied but the union must
also make a "bona fide" effort to minimize the effect of the picketing on neutrals in
common and roving situs situations.
3. The Washington Coca Cola doctrine has lost the automatic illegality of picket-
ing aspect and has been altered somewhat by the "an object" test. If the primary
employees can effectively be reached at the primary employer's establishment then
any other picketing of them would probably run afoul of the "an object" test.
4. The rigid rule application of the Board has been eroded by the enforcing
courts. More time will be given to a detailed examination of the entire union
activity in each factual situation before determining the legality of the picketing.
5. The trend seems to be a greater attempt to protect the neutral secondary
employer from the adverse effect of picketing. The balance seems to be drawing
away from the union and toward the neutrals.
DONALD K. Ho.
55. Id. at 336.
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SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT
OF 1940-EFFECT ON CERTAINTY OF LAND TITLES
The recent case of Hedrick v. Bigby,' decided by the Supreme Court of
Arkansas, vividly illustrates the way in which the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 19402 affects title to land. Leslie Hedrick, his mother and two sisters, owned
certain land in 1941. Hedrick entered the army in September, 1941, and was still in the
service at the time of this action in 1955, as an acknowledged career military officer.
In the years 1941, 1942, and 1943, different portions of the land were sold for taxes,
were deeded to the state, and three or four years later were deeded by the state to
plaintiff, Bigby. None of the defendants occupied or used the land prior to the tax
proceedings. Bigby went into possession of the lands in 1947, continued in possession
and paid taxes. In 1955, after being in possession for eight years, he brought
this suit to quiet title against any claims of defendants. The Chancellor found that
under Arkansas law the plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought and quieted title
in Bigby. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the decree. The court
held that section 525 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 19403 tolled the
running of the period of redemption in favor of defendant, Colonel Hedrick. Having
decided that Colonel Hedrick had a right to redeem, the court further held that he
could redeem for his co-tenants.
This is the usual and correct result under the law, however shocking or unfair it
may seem to be that one should have a right of redemption for fourteen years, and for
an indefinite number of years in the future, solely by virtue of his being in military
service continuously during the period.
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of October 17, 1940, is, in substance,
identical with the act of March 8, 1918. 4 The purpose of the act, as stated in section
510, was to promote national defense by making provision for the suspension of
,*. enforcement of civil liabilities, in certain cases, of persons in the military
service of the United States in order to enable such persons to devote their
entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation, and to this end the following
provisions are made for the temporary suspension of legal proceedings and
transactions which may prejudice the civil rights of persons in such service
during the period herein specified over which this Act . .. remains in force.
(Emphasis added.) 5
The act provided that it should remain in force until May 15, 1945, but if still at
war, "until such war is terminated by a treaty of peace proclaimed by the President
and for six months thereafter.6 As there was no peace treaty at the termination of
the fighting, Congress passed a joint resolution7 declaring the war terminated for the
1. 305 S.W.2d 674 (Ark. 1957).
2. 54 STAT. 1178 (1940), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 501-90 (1952).
3. 54 STAT. 1181 (1940), as amended, 50 U.S.C. APp. §§ 525 (1952), quoted note 23
infra. All references are to U.S. Code section numbers unless otherwise indicated.
4, 40 STAT. 440 (1918).
5. 54 STAT. 1179 (1940), 50 U.S.C. App. § 510 (1952).
6. 54 STAT. 1191 (1940), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 584 (1952).
7. 61 STAT. 454 (1947).
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purpose of article IV of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act8 as of July 25,
1947. But article IV of the act only dealt with insurance provisions, and nothing was
said as to the termination of the other sections of the act. Therefore the cases in this
area either presumed without discussion or expressly decided that the other sections
of the act remained in force.9
By a provision in the Universal Military Training and Service Act of June 24,
1948,10 Congress removed any doubt as to the future effectiveness of the act by
declaring Ihat, notwithstanding the previous, provisions for its termination,11
.. all of the provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940,
as amended... shall be applicable to all persons in the armed forces of the
United States... until such time as the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
of 1940, as amended, is repealed or otherwise terminated by subsequent Act
of Congress .... .
In its effect upon title to land, two sections of the act are of primary importance-
sections 56013 and 525.14
Section 56015 of the act limits the-sale of certain lands of a serviceman for non-
payment of taxes, and provides LUL redemption of these lands, if sold, within six
months after termination of military service.
8. 54 STAT. 1183 (1940), as-amended, 50 U.S.C. AP'. §§ 540-48 (1952).
9. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Bigby, supra note 1.
10. 62 STAT. 623 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 464 (1952).
11. See statutes cited notes 6 and 7 supra.
12. Statutes-cited note 10supr. Review of the legislative history of this section
extending the act, as reported in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14, at
2009 (1948), reveals no discussion of this provision except a statement in Senate
Report No. 1268, May 12, 1948, that this section provides the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940 shall be applicable to persons serving in the armed forces
pursuant to this act. This indicates that Congress probably gave little or no thought
to the serious effect the extension, in this manner, would have upon titles to land.
13. 54 STAT. 1186 (1940), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 560 (1952), quoted note 15
infra.
14. 54 STAT. 1181 (1940), as amended, 50 U.S.C. AP. § 525 (1952), quoted note 23
infra.
15. Section 560 reads, in part, as follows:
(1) The provisions of this section shall apply when any taxes or assessments,
whether general or special (other than taxes on income), whether falling due prior to
or during the period of military service, in respect of personal property, money, or
credits, or real property owned and occupied for dwelling, professional, business, or
agricultural purposes by a person in military service or his dependents at the com-
mencement of his period of military service and still so occupied by his dependents or
employees are not paid.
(2) No sale of such property shall be made to enforce the collection of such tax
or assessment, or any proceeding or action for such purpose commenced, except upon
leave of court granted upon application made therefor by the collector of taxes or
other officer whose duty it is to enforce the collection of taxes or assessments. The
court thereupon, unless in its opinion the ability of the person in military service to
pay such taxes or assessments is not materially affected by reason of such service,
may stay such proceedings or such sale, as provided in this Act, . . . for a period
extending not more than six months after the termination of the period of military
service of such person.
(3) When by law such property may be sold or forfeited to enforce the collection
of such tax or assessment, such person in military service shall have the right to
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The provisions of this section apply only to that real property owned and occupied
by the serviceman or his dependents, at the commencement of service and by his
dependents at the time of the tax sale, for dwelling, professional, business, or agricul-
tural purposes.16 In Margraf v. County of Los Angeles17 the serviceman was denied
relief under section 560 where it was shown that he never occupied the land in
question, but merely acquired another's right to redeem prior to entry into service.
It was held in Day v. Jones18 that the serviceman who had neither lived on nor
farmed the land in question did not occupy the -land for agricultural purposes as
required in section 560 by merely going on the land after buying it, assuming control
over it, and riding past it two or three times a year to see if anyone was trespassing
upon it.
Those lands of a serviceman falling within the above classifications may be sold
for nonpayment of taxes only upon leave of court. Were it not for subsection (3), this
provision as to sales would not be a great threat to stability of land titles as its
operation is in the discretion of the court which may permit a sale, particularly if it
finds that the ability of the serviceman to piy the tax is not materially affected by
reason of his being in service.'2 But even though the court allows the sale, the
serviceman has the right to redeem under subsection (3) until six months after
termination of his military service.2 0 Unlike the above limitation upon sales, this
extension of the period of redemption is automatic, and has the effect of amending
state statutes fixing periods of limitations on the right to redeem. 2 1 It is this automatic
redeem or commence an action to redeem such property, at any time not later than
six months after the termination of such service, but in no case later than six months
after the date when this Act... ceases to be in force; but this shall not be taken to
shorten any period, now or hereafter provided by the laws of any State or Territory
for such redemption.
See Annot., 32 A..R.2d 619 (1953), where cases decided under this section are
briefed.
16. Peterson v. Johnson, 249 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 1952) (en banc); Karger v. Stead,
64 A.2d 155, 159 (Md. 1949).
17. 144 Cal. App. 2d 647, 651, 301 P.2d 490, 494 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
18. 112 Utah 286, 292, 187 P.2d 181, 183 (1947).
19. Waldron v. People, 181 Misc. 443, 46 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Brooklyn
Trust Co. v. Shapiro, 180 Misc. 454, 41 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
20. Le Maistre v. Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 5 (1948); Day v. Jones, 112 Utah 286, 295,
187 P.2d 181, 185 (1947). After a court has determined that a serviceman's ability to
pay his taxes has not been materially affected by reason of military service, and
pursuant to such finding under section 560(2) authorizes a tax sale, it might seem
that he should not have his right of redemption protected and extended by sections 525
and 560(3) beyond what local law may permit. However, a reading of sections 525
and 560(3) and the cases cited supra leads one to the conclusion that this extended
permit of redemption is provided by the several sections of the statute. The statutory
period within which the serviceman has a right to redeem is extended under section
525, and to some extent under section 560 (3), as to all land owned by the serviceman.
Additional protection is given a serviceman as to his land used for dwelling, profes-
sional, business, or agricultural purposes, by section 560(2), which prevents the sale
of such property except upon leave of court. Section 560(2) was intended to enlarge
rather than diminish the rights of the serviceman with respect to land used for these
special purposes.
21. United States v. Alberts, 59 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Wash. 1945). After holding
that the act had the effect of amending state statutes, the court upheld the constitu-
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extension of the right to redeem which creates title problems, as will be pointed out
more fully in the discussion below.
But even if relief is denied under section 560, a serviceman may still be entitled
to relief under section 525 of the act.2 2
Section 52523 is the most important section of the act in its effect upon title to
land. That provision, as enacted in 1940, declares that the time in military service
shall not be included in computing any period of limitation now or hereafter pro-
vided by st'atute for the bringing of any action by or against a serviceman. Military
service occurring after October 6, 1942, is specifically excluded, by the amendments
of that date, from the computation of periods allowed for redemption of land by the
serviceman.2 4
The suspension of the running of periods of limitation during military service
applies to limitations upon the bringing of "any action" and is not limited to the
suspension of those statutes properly called statutes of limitation.25 This wag estab-
lished in the early case of Clark v. Mechanics' American Nat'l Bank,20 decided under
a similar provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1918. There the
serviceman was allowed to make claim to a mechanic's lien where by deducting the
period of military service, the claim was filed within the one year period limited by
Arkansas statute.
Neither is the application of section 525 limited to land of a certain character as
is section 560. Efforts by the Florida supreme court to limit the application of section
525 to those lands, enumerated, in. section 560 (those used for dwelling, professional,
tionality of the act, as interpreted, based upon the war power of Congress. The court
relied upon the early Supreme Court case of Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493(1870), upholding an act of Congress of 1864 which suspended the running of statutes
of limitations during the period a defendant or accused was beyond the reach ofjudicial process by reason of the Civil War. It might be argued that the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act, so far as it has the effect of automatically amending state
statutes, is unconstitutional during a time when the nation is a peace.
22. Le Maistre v. Leffers, supra note 20; Hedrick v. Bigby, 305 S.W.2d 674 (Ark.
1957); Margraf v. County of Los Angeles, 144 Cal. App. 2d 647, 301 P.2d 490 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1956); Day v. Jones, 112 Utah 286, 187 P.2d 181 (1947).
23. Section 525 reads as follows:
The period of military service shall not be included in computing any period now
or hereafter to be limited by any law, regulation, or order for the bringing of any
action or proceeding in any court, board, bureau, commission, department, or other
agency of government by or against any person in military service or by or against
his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, whether such cause of action or the
right or privilege to institute such action or proceeding shall have accrued prior to or
during the period of such service, nor shall any part of such period which occurs
after the date of enactment of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments
of 1942 [Oct. 6, 1942] be included in computing any period now or hereafter provided
by any law for the redemption of real property sold or forfeited to enforce any
obligation, tax, or assessment.
24. The latter portion of section 525 concerning redemption was not a part of
the Act of 1940, but was added by the amendments of Oct. 6, 1942. 56 STAT. 770 (1942).
See note 23 supra for text of the section.
25. 2 PATToN, TITLEs § 563 n.66 (2d ed. 1957).
26. 282 Fed. 589, 591 (8th Cir. 1922).
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business, or agricultural purposes) 27 were rejected by the United States Supreme
Court in Le Maistre v. Leffers where it held that:
The two sections . . . supplement each other. Section 500 150 U.S.C. APP.
§ 560], applicable to restricted types of real property, gives greater protection
than § 205 [50 U.S.C. APP. § 525]. It restrains the sale for taxes or assess-
ments of specified types of real property except upon leave of court and
prescribes for them a specified time within which the right to redeem may be
exercised if the property is sold. Section 205 150 U.S.C. APP. § 525] extends
in terms to all lands and only tolls the time for redemption for the period of
military service.2 8
The Supreme Court also held in the Le Maistre case that the application of
section 525 was not limited, as to redemption from tax sales, to those states having
statutes which pass title after tax sale subject to defeasance by redemption, but was
also applicable under the Florida statute which provided that issuance of the tax deed
passed title and ended the period of redemption. The Florida statute provided that
the holder of a certificate of sale could apply for a tax deed after two years from
the sale. In the subsequent case of Burke -. O'Brien,2 9 the Florida supreme court
held that certain tax deeds were void and set them aside as having been issued
prematurely, since that part of the two-year period during which the plaintiff was
in service could not be counted against him. The same result was reached in the
Margraf case under a California statute providing that issuance of a tax deed by the
state terminates the period of redemption. The court held that the effect of the act
was to preclude the termination of an existing right of redemption so long as the
holder thereof is in military service.
Using this approach, that the act creates no new rights but precludes the
termination of any existing rights, the Missouri supreme court denied relief under
the act to a serviceman who claimed under an unacknowledged, unrecorded deed, in
the case of Godwin v. Gerling.30 The court held that the serviceman was not even
the equitable owner, but only had an equitable claim against one of the record
owners personally, which did not bring him under the coverage of the act which
protects the soldier's ownership in land. This was a fair and equitable result upon
the facts, but its holding as to the rights of one claiming under an unacknowledged,
unrecorded deed was contrary to what was thought to be the law in Missouri.
The way in which the act precludes the termination of an existing right is to
suspend the running of periods of limitation for the period of military service. That
part of military service occurring after October 6, 1942, may not be counted in
computing the periods of redemption. This suspension has the effect of amending
state statutes to give additional time for redemption. 31 The suspension is self-
27. Le Maistre v. Leffers, 159 Fla. 122, 31 So. 2d 155 (1947); De Loach v. Calihan,
158 Fla. 639, 30 So. 2d 910 (1947).
28. 333 U.S. 1, 5 (1948); accord, Day v. Jones, 122 Utah 286, 295, 187 P.2d 181, 185
(1947).
29. 47 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1950).
30. 362 Mo. 19, 30, 239 S.W.2d 352, 359 (1951) (en banc), 17 Mo. L. REV. 471
(1952).
31. Peace v. Bullock, 252 Ala. 155, 40 So. 2d 82 (1949); Margraf v. County of Los
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executing.3 2 It is not merely directory or permissive, but is imperatively controlling,
and automatically extends the period allowed for redemption or assertion of rights in
all cases coming with in its terms.3 3
Patton makes the following comment on the act:
The moratoria created by this act in favor of persons in the military service
of the United States has affected the conclusiveness of all titles based upon
official sales since October 17, 1940. So long as the act remains in force no
part of the period of military service subsequent to October 6, 1942, is to be
'included in computing any period now or hereafter provided by any law for
the redemption of real property sold or forfeited to enforce any obligation,
tax, or assessment.'
3 4
As noted earlier, the act in its present form remains in force until it is changed by a
subsequent act of Congress.
Although there was much merit in the original purpose and effect of the act-to
promote national defense by helping those who were uprooted by military service-its
long-continued extension has been undesirable, and current applications of the act
reach a result surely never intended by Congress. In Burden v. Traister,3 5 the New
York supreme court allowed a career soldier to redeem over twelve years after
forfeiture and specifically rejected the argument that a career military man should
not have the benefit. of the act. The court said that since petitioner entered service in
1943, at the height of the emergency, he was unquestionably among the class the act
was designed to protect, and it was unwilling to deny relief in 1955, just because he
had chosen-tov remain in service. The Arkansas court in Hedrick v. Bigby, discussed
earlier, recognized a right of redemption in a career serviceman of fourteen years.
It also allowed him to redeem for his co-tenants in common.
The method used in the act to protect interests of servicemen is automatic, and
because it has been in force so long (nearly 18 years) it creates great potential title
difficulties. These defects are serious because they are not cured by adverse
possession as are most title defects. The present act does not protect according to
merit. It protects those pursuing a certain occupation-military service.
The question remains as to how we shall deal with the problems created by the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. Patton points out that "the title standards of
several bar associations treat the possibility of divesture of the record title by reason
of military service as being too remote to affect marketability." 3 6 This procedure may
seem to be sound in view of the relatively small number of cases which have arisen.
But the weakness of this attempted solution is made apparent from a consideration of
Angeles, 144 Cal. App. 2d 647, 301 P.2d 490 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Burke v. O'Brien,
supra note 29; Illinois Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Gwinn, 390 IlM 345, 61 N.E.2d 249
(1945).
32. Illinois Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Gwinn, supra note 31.
33. Peace v. Bullock, supra note 31.
34. 2 PATTON, TrLEs § 591 (2d ed. 1957).
35. 3 Misc. 2d 928, 933, 148 N.Y.S.2d 60, 65 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
36. 2 PATTON, op. cit. supra note 34 § 591, at 528.
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the cases which have arisen under the act.37 Where title is affected by the act, the
consequences are usually severe and inequitable, and future cases promise to be
even more harsh. It would seem to be better procedure for the purchaser to require
the abstract of title to land which has been the subject of an official sale since
October 17, 1940, to show that the holders of any right of redemption were not in
military service. If it is found that they were in military service at the time they
had a right of redemption, a careful investigation should be made to determine that
they are no longer protected by the act, and if th isis questionable, quit-claim deeds
should be obtained from them.
The only effective solution to the title problems created by the long-continued
effectiveness of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act will be for Congress to
amend it so as to eliminate automatic relief to all servicemen for an indefinite period.
Except as to the temporary periods of active hostilities, the act should protect only
those persons whose ability to meet their obligations or protect their rights has been
adversely affected to a substantial degree by reason of being uprooted by military
service. This end might be attained by giving state courts discretionary power to
extend or withhold relief, as is already the case with many of the provisions of the
act. Perhaps a more effective way to correct the problem would be for Congress
periodically to terminate protection under sections 525 and 560 (3) of the act, allowing
suitable grace periods before the protection is terminated; such a provision could be
self-executing and would not require affirmative court action. In this manner those
who deserve the protection of the act would have it for reasonable periods. Such an
amendment would remove the present drastic provision which automatically suspends
the running of periods of limitation for the entire period of military service, and
defects in title caused by military service could be cured by adverse possession.
MELvIN E. CAmAnRA
37. In each of the cases listed below an action was maintained after the normal
period of limitation had run. Unless otherwise indicated, this resulted from an
application of either section 525 or section 560, or both, of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act.
Land redeemed from tax lien foreclosure: Burke v. O'Brien, supra note 29;
Burden v. Traister, supra note 35.
Tax deed set aside: Le Maistre v. Leffers, 333 U.S. 1 (1948).
Quiet title action maintained by serviceman for land sold for taxes: Burkhead v.
Briggs, 86 Cal. App. 2d 803, 196 P.2d 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Day v. Jones, 112 Utah
286, 187 P.2d 181 (1947).
County Collector enjoined from selling land deeded to the state for nonpayment
of taxes 22 years earlier, where petitioner was in military service and the statute
provided sale by the state terminates the indefinite right to redeem: Margraf v.
County of Los Angeles, 144 Cal. App 2d 647, 301 P.2d 490 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
Quiet title action maintained against the serviceman under that part of section 525
which suspends the running of limitations on actions by or against the serviceman:
Kasner v. Ashburn, 200 Okla. 256, 192 P.2d 649 (Okla. 1948).
Land redeemed from mortgage foreclosure: Peace v. Bullock, 252 Ala. 155, 40 So.
2d 82 (1949); Illinois Natl Bank v. Gwinn, 390 Ill. 345, 61 N.E.2d 249 (1945) (service-
man was beneficial owner of land held in trust for him).
Condemnation award (in place of property sold for nonpayment of taxes) given
to serviceman: United States v. Alberts, 59 F. Supp. 298 (E. D. Wash. 1945).
Serviceman allowed to intervene to set aside tax sale for irregularities after
expiration of one year period allowed by Mechanic's lien claimed and foreclosed:
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SURVIVORSHIP AFTER JOINT TENANTS EXECUTE
CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND*
A possible danger to land titles has been brought to light by the doctrine
expounded in Buford v. Dahlkel and In re Baker's Estate.2 The facts of the two
cases are almost identical. Husband and wife (hereafter referred to as H and W,,
respectively) owners of a certain tract of land as joint tenants, entered into a contract
to convey this realty. While the contract was still executory, H died. The question
waswhether the heirs of H were entitled 'to a share in the purchase price. Both
courts held that the heirs of H were entitled to share in the purchase price with W.
They reasoned that the contract to convey entered into by H and W effected a
severance of the joint tenancy with right of survivorship and converted it into a
tenancy in common without right of survivorship. Therefore, when H died his
undivided one-half interest in the land descended to his heirs, who are now entitled
to a share in the purchase money.
The most important aspect of these cases is not that H's heirs were given a
share of the purchase money. Rather, what is important is that under this doctrine
the surviving tenant does not survive to all right, title, and interest in the land;
and therefore the survivor cannot effectively convey a title to the purchaser that
is either marketable of record or good in fact. This being so, the stability of land
titles in Missouri which rest upon the conveyance by a surviving joint tenant in
the type of case under consideration depends upon whether the Missouri supreme
court would follow the Buford and Baker cases or would reject the doctrine of these
cases.
A joint tenancy exists where an estate in property, real or personal, is held
per my et per tout by the joint tenants. The essential elements of a joint tenancy
are the four unities of interest, title, time, and possession. This means that the
tenants must have the same interests both as to the share of the common property
and as to the period of duration of the interest of each; that the titles of all the
tenants must be derived from one instrument; that the tenants must have acquired
their estates at the same time; and that the tenants must have equal rights to
Clark v. Mechanics' American Nat'l Bank, 282 Fed. 589 (8th Cir. 1922); Crawford v.
Adams, 213 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
Breach of warranty action by serviceman: Maurice v. Schmidt, 214 Ark. 725, 218
S.W.2d 356 (1949).
Statutory period limited for substitution of parties held extended by sections 521,
524, and 525 of the act; Shire v. Superior Court, 63, Ariz. 420, 162 P.2d 909 (1945).
Partition proceeding reopened because section 520 of the act (concerning non-
appearance of serviceman at proceedings) not complied with: Mitchell v. Richardson,
187 Tenn. 189, 213 S.W.2d 111 (1948).
*The basic research for this comment was undertaken by four students in the
University of Missouri School of Law: Charles E. Brown, Marion F. Wasinger, John
E. Luther, and Ted M. Henson, Jr. The writer, Mr. Henson, here acknowledges his
indebtedness to Messrs. Brown, Wasinger, and Luther.
1. 158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954), 41 CORNELL L.Q. 154 (1955).
2. 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863 (1956), 42 IowA L. REV. 646 (1957), 55 Micn. L.
REV. 1194 (1957).
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possession. There can be no joint tenancy at common law if one of these unities
is missing.
The most important incident of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship. This
right of survivorship means that upon the death of one of the joint tenants the
entire estate continues in the surviving joint tenant, and no interest in the estate
passes to the heirs or devisees of the deceased tenant.3
This right of survivorship is of course extinguished if the joint tenancy is
terminated otherwise than by the death of a joint. tenant.4 If there is such a
termination, the tenants will then hold as tenants in common as long as the unity
of possession remains, for unity of possession is all that is required for a tenancy
in common. As tenants in common, each tenant is the owner of an undivided interest
in the whole estate, and upon his death his undivided interest passes to his heirs
or devisees. There is a severance or termination when a joint tenant conveys his
interest to a stranger,5 because there is no unity of time and title between the
stranger and the remaining tenant. It has also been held that a contract by one joint
tenant to convey his interest to a third person acts as a severance.6 This is well
settled in equity because of the equitable maxim that equity regards as done what
in good conscience ought to be done. In addition, joint tenants by their mutual
agreement may sever their joint tenancy. 7 And in at least one case a court has
held that a conveyance by all the joint tenants "destroys" the joint tenancy.8
That these acts by some or all of the tenants effect a severance has never been
seriously questioned. The difficulty comes when the foregoing rules of law are
applied to the facts of the Buford and Baker cases. Does it follow that a contract to
convey by all the joint tenants severs the joint tenancy? The Nebraska and Iowa
supreme courts answered this question in the affirmative.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in the Buford case believed that there was a
severance because the unities of title, interest, and possession had been destroyed
by the contract of sale. This is so, said the court, because if a contract to convey by
one joint tenant operates as a severance and if a conveyance by all the joint tenants
destroys the joint tenancy, "it logically follows ... that if all the joint tenants enter
into a joint contract to sell the joint property ...this destroys the joint tenancy
in the realty. . . ."9 This severance occurs through the mysterious working of the
doctrine of equitable conversion. The effect of equitable conversion on the unities
is explained by the court:
The ownership of the real estate described in this case as such passed
to the purchasers by the contract made by the owners and from that time
3. 14 Am. Jur., Cotenancy § 6 (1938).
4. For an extensive discussion of the whole problem of severance, see Annot.,
129 A.L.R. 813 (1940).
5. Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 224 (1932).
6. 2 TIFFANY, Tii LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 425 (3d ed. 1939).
7. Greiger v. Pye, 210 Minn. 71, 297 N.W. 173 (1941).
8. Ball v. Mann, 88 Cal. App. 2d 695, 199 P.2d 706 (1948). This is but to state
the obvious.
9. 158 Neb. at 45, 62 N.W.2d at 256.
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forth the vendors had only the legal title as security for a debt and this they
held as trustees. The interest the vendees acquired was real estate. The right
conferred by the contract upon the vendors was personal property. The
contract put the vendees in complete possession of the real estate. Their
possession was adverse to any right of possession of the vendors. The vendees
are in possession as owners and the vendors or their successors can never by
their own volition alone terminate that posession or ownership. It is not
convincing to contend that the joint tenancy continued when the tenants
by their voluntary act deprived themselves of their unities of possession,
interest, and title. They had neither title to the real estate, interest in,
nor possession of it after the contract of sale was made. The contract of
sale destroyed the joint tenancy of the vendors.' 0
The Iowa supreme court in the Baker case began its approach to the problem
by noting that the "four unities" common law rule was not the law in Iowa. The
law was rather that the intention of the parties should prevail. Having stated this
to be the law in Iowa,ll the court ignored this proposition and proceeded to make
an analysis comparable to that made in the Buford case. In fact the court purported
to rely on the Buford case and concluded that if a severance occurs when one joint
tenant contracts to convey, the same result must follow when both joint tenants
enter into a contract of conveyance even though the vendors retain legal title as
security. The court, it seems, overlooked the fact that the reason there is a severance
where one of the two joint tenants conveys his interest in the property is that
there is no unity of time and title between the stranger and the remaining tenant.12
If Iowa does not follow the four unities doctrine but instead looks to the parties'
intention, it makes no difference whether a contract to convey by one or both joint
tenants destroys some of the unities through the doctrine of equitable- conversion
since the intention of the parties is controlling anyway.
There is a vigorous dissent in the Baker case. There are also several law review
articles which attack the doctrine of the Buford and Baker cases. This criticism is
essentially twofold:
(1) If the intention of the parties to sever should control (as was initially stated
by the court in the Baker case), then there should be no severance since there is
an absence of any intention on the part of the parties to sever.
(2) If the issue of severance is to be decided on the basis of whether one or
more unities were destroyed (the view ostensibly taken in the Buford case), there
should be no severance because even though equitable conversion takes place their
respective rights as joint tenants remain the same.
As to the first point, it would seem to go against the intention of the parties
10. Id. at 47, 62 N.W.2d at 257.
11. It seems that the law in Iowa, at the time the Baker case wis decided, was
that the intention of the parties should control. An unanimous court, ten years before
the Baker case, said, "we are more in accord with the latter which holds that the rule
as to the intention of the parties should prevail over the technical common law rules
as to the creation of joint tenancies, and such we believe has been the trend of our
decisions in this state." Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 791-92, 23 N.W.2d 837, 839
(1946).
12. Gwinn v. Commissioner, supra note 5.
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to say that a contract to convey by all the joint tenants operates as a severance.
In Hayes' Estate,13 an Irish case, six sisters held land as joint tenants. All of the
sisters joined in a contract to sell the property to a third party in exchange for
stock. Two of the sisters died while the contract was still executory, and their
successors contended they were entitled to a share in the stock on the ground that
the contract effected a severance of the joint tenancy. The lower court held that
an agreement to sell land entered into by all the joint tenants effectecl a-severanice
of the joint tenancy. The High Court of Justice reversed this decision. In his opinion
Campbell, C., observed:
In this case I can find no evidence of any intention on the part of the
joint tenants to sever. At first I thought there might be some weight in
the suggestion that by reason of their deliberate act in changing the subject-
matter of the property from land into money, an inference might be drawn
that severance was intended, as, generally speaking, money might reasonably
be supposed to be held by the owners thereof in their respective shares and
proportions. On the other hand, the purchase-money in this case is repre-
sented by stock, and there is no reason in the nature of things why joint
tenants might not be equally well satisfied to hold the stock as joint property
just in the same way as if, instead of selling the estate for money, they
had exchanged it for other lands .... 14
This view of Campbell, C., that the joint tenants intended that the proceeds of the
sale of realty were to represent the realty and were to be held in the same manner
as the realty was held, finds support in the American authorities.1 s
Another way to view the intention of the joint tenants in entering into a
contract to sell can be found in Kurowsld v. Retail Ha'rdware Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
of Minn.'8 In this case H and W owned a certain lot as joint tenants. H and his son
were partners in a mercantile business, and they agreed that the partnership would
erect a building on the lot and that the partnership would be the owner of the lot.
The building was erected and was used for partnership business for eight years.
Just before the fire insurance with the defendant company was renewed the last
time, W died intestate leaving several children. Subsequently, the partnership
brought an action to recover a fire loss from the defendant insurance company. The
insurance company defended on the ground that the partnership did not own the
lot in fee simple as required by the policy. The theory of the defendant was that
legal title did not vest in H by survivorship when W died because the partnership
agreement and the acts pursuant thereto severed the joint tenancy. Therefore, when
W died W and H held as tenants in common, and W's interest descended to her
heirs. The court held that there was no severance by the partnership agreement or
the acts pursuant thereto. Looking at H's actions as they appeared in the record,
the court said:
Here the agreement ... was not to transfer his interest to the partnership
13. 1 Ir. R. 103, 207 (1920).
14. Id. at 209-10.
15. Childs v. Childs, 293 Mass. 67, 199 N.E. 383 (1935); Allen v. Tate, 58 Miss.
585, (1881); In re Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628, 27 AtI. 405 (1893).
16. 203 Wis. 644, 234 N.W. 900 (1931).
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but the entire property. This he could not do except on the assumption that
he was or contemplated becoming the sole owner. If he assumed he was the
sole owner, as he probably did, there was no idea of severance. And if he
had the state of the title in mind and its legal effect . . . he must have
contemplated survivorship as the only contingency that alone would enable
him to carry out his agreement. We are unable to perceive why in equity
the agreement should be held to effect a severance when the circumstances
all indicate that such effect could not have been intended or contemplated. 17
This approach in looking to see what reasonable intention can be imputed to
the party whose acts allegedly operated as a severance may be the most rational
solution to this problem. If the court had wanted to, there is no reason it could
not have held that there was a severance of the joint tenancy under the four unities
doctrine. Such a result would follow under this doctrine on the ground that H had
not only agreed to convey his interest to the partnership but had in fact conveyed it.
It is submitted that there was more reason to say here that there was a severance
than there was in the Buford and Baker cases. In the Kurowski case the alleged
acts of severance were committed by only one of the joint tenants, and this would
tend to make the respective rights of the joint tenants dissimilar. In the Nebraska
and Iowa cases the alleged acts of severance were committed by both parties thus
preserving mutuality of rights between them. Also, in the Kurowski case, one
could argue that there was a conveyance by H of his interest in the land to the
partnership. But in the Buford and Baker cases no conveyance was made by the
joint tenants; all they did was enter into a contract of sale. The court in the
Kurowski case could not only have reached the same result as the Iowa and
Nebraska courts- but could have done so on generally accepted principles. But this
court did not concern itself with legal fictions. Instead the court reached what may
properly be called a just result by imputing to H the kind of reasonable intention
he would have had if he had been cognizant of the legal import of his acts.
Another case in which this same approach was used is In re De Witt's Will.8
H and W, owners of land as tenants by the entirety, contracted to convey to a third
party. H died. An action was brought by one of the co-executors of the will of H to
recover one-half of the remainder of installments due under the land contract. The
court held the contract for the sale of land did not sever the tenancy by the entirety,
so that when H died W became entitled to the whole of the installments due under
the contract. The court looked to the contract to discover what reasonable intention
could be imputed to the parties. The contract read:
It is further understood and agreed that the parties of the first part [H and
W] shall be under no obligation to return any payments made hereunder
to the party of the second part, and all parties agree that in the event of
default, that the payments so made shall be rent.19 (Emphasis added.)
The court found that the italicized expression was a sufficient basis to impute an
intention to H and W that severance through equitable conversion should not take
place.
17. Id. at 648, 234 N.W. at 901-02.
18. 202 Misc. 167, 114 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
19. Id. at 170, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
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There is no good reason why the reasonable intention of the parties, as it is
imputed to them by the courts, should not be made the sole test for determining
if a severance occurs, and there is good reason why the courts should make this
intention controlling. First, it is the duty of the courts in all cases in which contracts
are interpreted to follow as closely as practicable the manifested intentions of the
parties and to give effect to those intentions.20 This is also the rule as to deeds.
2
'
Second, there is a present tendency to let clear intention create survivorship even
though the four unities are lacking.2 2 A fortiori, the same rule should be followed
regarding the destruction of joint tenancies as is followed concerning the creation -
of these same tenancies. The wiser policy would seem to make both depend on
what reasonable intention is imputed to the parties in the light of all of the facts
and circumstances of the case as well as the relationship and situation of the parties.
In the case of husband and wife, it would not be difficult to approximate what
the parties most likely would have intended had they given the matter any thought.23
Turning now to the second point of the criticism, it is submitted that even if
the four unities doctrine is to apply the view taken in the Baker and Buford cases
is still indefensible.
First, according to both courts, if there is a severance when one joint tenant
enters into a contract to convey, the same result must follow when all joint tenants
enter into a contract of conveyance even if they retain legal title to the land as
security. This, it seems, is a classic non sequitur. It is well settled that a contract to
convey by one joint tenant works a severance, but it does not follow that a contract
to convey by all the joint tenants produces this same result unless the reason for
the former result is equally applicable to the latter result. The reason for the former
result is that when one tenant conveys his interest to a stranger there is no unity
of time and title between the stranger and the tenant who remains and that in
equity this process is regarded as having already occurred when the selling tenant
and the stranger enter into the contract of conveyance because "equity regards
as done that which in good conscience ought to be done." Is this reason applicable
to the case in which all joint tenants enter the contract to convey? It seems that it
is not. It is not contemplated that a stranger will take the place of one of the tenants.
20. ". . . the primary and cardinal rule, which permeates and pervades the
entire field of construction, is that the court should ascertain the intention of the
parties and then give effect thereto unless it conflicts with some positive rule of
law." Cook v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 281 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955).
21. "The intention of the grantor, as gathered from the four corners of the
instrument, is now the pole star of construction. That intention may be expressed
anywhere in the instrument, and in any words, the simpler and plainer the better,
that will impart it, and the court will enforce it no matter in what part of the instru-
ment it is found." Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 284, 294, 70 S.W. 702, 705 (1902).
22. See Therrien v. Therrien, 94 N.H. 66, 46 A.2d 538 (1946).
23. "In determining how the cotenants wish to hold the purchase price the
courts should give due consideration to the way in which the land was owned.
The tenancy, formed by husband and wife and subject to survivorship, should be
viewed as an arrangement for holding wealth. When looked at in this manner the
alteration in the form of that wealth should not affect the manner in which it is
held .... The close ties of the parties would bolster the inference that survivorship
was intended." 41 CORNELL L.Q. 154, 159-60 (1955).
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The respective rights of the joint tenants remain mutual, and their relationship
remains unimpaired. The unities of title, time, interest, and possession remain the
same.
Second, according to the Nebraska court (presumably the Iowa court would
agree), by the doctrine of equitable conversion when the joint tenants entered into
the contract of sale the ownership of the real estate passed to the purchasers, the
tenants had only bare legal title as security, the interest of the purchasers was
realty, the contract put the purchasers into complete possession, and the tenants
had deprived themselves of their unities of title, interest, and possession. All of this
is said to destroy the joint tenancy. Should the doctrine of equitable conversion
be said to effect such a result?
It is highly questionable if the doctrine of equitable conversion should have any
application at all. It would seem in fact, in connection with this problem of sever-
ance, that equitable conversion is wholly misapplied. It has been well stated:
Equitable conversion is not a rule of law to be reasoned from, but a short
hand way of describing the consequences of the rule that a land contract will
be specifically enforced by a court of equity, and should only be applied
where it will carry out the intention of the parties. 24
Such was the attitude of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Watson v. Watson.25 In
that case, H and W were owners in joint tenancy of a certain piece of property.
This they contracted to sell to one Stone. H died. W continued after H's death to
collect payments under the terms of the contract. A share in these payments was
claimed by the administrator of H's estate. The only possible theory, said the court,
which would support the administrator's contention was that through the doctrine
of equitable conversion the payments would be treated in administration as person-
alty. But equitable conversion, said the court, "would have no application on these
facts to divest the surviving joint tenant of her rights."20 There can be no doubt
that the doctrine of equitable conversion may be appropriately applied in many
situations. For example, when a testator devises his land in trust and directs that
after his death his land be sold and the money distributed to certain beneficiaries,
the interests of the beneficiaries are in personalty and not in realty.27 Also, equitable
conversion has been applied to give the vendee all benefits attaching to the property
and to subject him to all losses which may befall the land while the contract is
executory.28 These are familiar equitable principles, which are recognized almost
universally. But the use of equitable conversion in connection with destruction of
joint tenancies when all tenants enter a joint contract to convey is a noval idea,
indeed. It may well be concluded that an extension of such a fiction into this sphere
of the law is inappropriate and unwarranted unless good reasons exist for such an
extension. There are no good reasons for such an extension, or at least none have
24. Id. at 155-56.
25. 5 Ill. 2d 526, 126 N.E.2d 220 (1955).
26. Id. at 533, 126 N.E.2d at 224.
27. Sherman v. Flack, 283 Ill. 457, 119 N.E. 293 (1918).
28. 19 Am. JuR., Equitable Conversion § 15 (1939).
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been offered. And there is a good reason why such an extension should not be made.
Equitable conversion "is not a fixed rule of law but a mere fiction of equity designed
to effectuate the obvious intention of the parties and to promot6 justice."29 It
follows that when the doctrine of equitable conversion would defeat the intention
of the parties, it should not be used.
In In re Maguire's Estate,30 a New York case, H and W acquired property as
tenants by the entirety. In February H and W entered into a contract for the sale
of the property. On the signing of the contract H received a deposit with the balance
to be paid in April. W died in March. In April H had executed and delivered a deed
to the purchaser and received the balance of the purchase money due. Six years
later H died testate. The administratrix of W's estate claimed one-half of the net
amount received by H on the sale. The surrogate court found against the adminis-
tratrix. The court was of the opinion that a conversion occurred when the contract
was signed, which converted the tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common.
But the proceeds were not to be held equally if the facts showed that equitably
they should hold different shares. H had furnished the primary purchase price, and
there was no evidence that he intended to give any part to W. Thus, according to
the court, the proceeds of the contract were the sole property of H.
The appellate division took a different view. This court found that there was
no necessity for invoking the doctrine of equitable conversion. This was because a
surviving tenant by the entirety becomes sole owner, not because he succeeds to
any interest of the deceased tenant, but because of the original grant to him as one
of the tenants by the entirety. "To invoke .it [equitable conversion] would . . .ignore
the intention of the parties at the time they acquired the property."3 1 But there is
dictum that the court would hold survivorship was terminated once the contract
of sale had been executed by delivery of a deed. Possibly a sounder basis upon
which this case could have been decided would be what the intention of H and W
was at the time they signed the contract of sale. Instead the court looked to the
parties' intention at the time they acquired the property. Nevertheless, the court
was unwilling to allow the workings of any legal fiction to disturb the result it
conceived to be intended by the parties.
Another case in which a court refused on this same ground to apply the doctrine
of equitable conversion is Detroit & Security Trust Co. v. Kramer.-"2 In this case,
H and W, owners of two parcels of land as tenants by the entirety, contracted to
convey the land. W died. H received the balance due on the contracts. The heirs of
W's estate sought to recover one-half of this money paid to H. The trial court
decreed that H as surviving tenant was entitled to all the purchase price unpaid
on these contracts at the time of W's death. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed
the lower court's decree and rejected the idea that equitable conversion should apply:
To hold in this case that on account of the equitable doctrine of conversion
the respective rights of survivorship between Mr. and Mrs. Kramer
29. In re Maguire's Estate, 251 App. Div. 337, 338, 296 N.Y. Supp. 528, 531 (2d
Dep't 1937), af'd, 277 N.Y. 527, 13 N.E.2d 458 (1938).
30. Ibid.
31. Id. at 339, 296 N.Y. Supp. at 532.
32. 247 Mich. 468, 226 N.W. 234 (1929).
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[H and W] were terminated by the execution of executory contracts to sell,
is to nullify the settled plan for the disposition of their properties which
they deliberately adopted without there being the slighest proof of any
intention or desire on the part of either so to do ...
We think. it conclusively appears in this record that Mr. and Mrs. Kramer
so arranged their respective properties that in effect it amounted to a con-
tractual understanding that each should take and hold a right of survivorship
in the other's property. . . . If Mrs. Kramer by will had left all her real
estate to her surviving husband, the court would hold it to be its plain
duty to carry into effect the obvious intent of the testatrix as the same
appeared in her last will and testament. It is equally the duty of the court
to give the force and effect to the deeds of Mr. and Mrs. Kramer whereby
they created each in the other a right of survivorship.3 3
These, then, are the two principal criticisms made against the doctrine of the
Buford and Baker cases. But, these two arguments do not exhaust all the adverse
criticisms of these cases. Another reason is that the weight of authority (if such a
term is permissible in this relatively uncharted area of the law) is decidedly against
the result reached in the Buford and Baker cases.3 4
There is also the matter of unmecessarily jeoparaizing land titles. -Concerning
the doctrine of the Buford and Baker cases, it has been said: "The plain holding-
relating to the purchase price-will create great practical inconvenience; the clear
implication-relating to title-is disastrous."3 5
33. Id. at 472-74, 226 N.W. at 235.
34. Watson v. Watson, 5 fll. 2d 526, 126 N.E.2d 220 (1955); Childs v. Childs, 293
Mass- 67, 199 N.E. 383 (1936); Foy v. King, 248 Mich. 650, 227 N.W. 541 (1929) (no
discussion); Detroit & Security Trust Co. v. Kramer, supra note 32; Allen v. Tate, 58
Miss. 585 (1881); McArthur v. Weaver, 129 App. Div. 743, 133 N.Y. Supp. 1095 (4th
Dep't 1909) (no discussion); In re De Witt's Will, 202 Misc. 167, 114 N.Y.S.2d 81
(Surr. Ct. 1952); In re McKinney's Estate, 175 Misc. 377, 24 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Surr. Ct.
1940) (no discussion); In re Maguire's Estate, 161 Misc. 219, 291 N.Y. Supp. 753
(Surr. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 251 App. Div. 337, 296 N.Y. Supp. 528 (2d Dep't 1937), ajj'd,
277 N.Y. 527, 13 N.E.2d 458 (1938); In re Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628, 27 Ati.
405 (1893); Simon v. Chartier, 250 Wis. 642, 27 N.W.2d 752 (1947) (no discussion);
Xurowski v. Retail Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Minn., 203 Wis. 644, 234 N.W.
900 (1931); see Commissioner v. Hart, 76 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1935); cf. Fish v. Security-
First Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles, 31 Cal. 2d 378, 189 P.2d 10 (1948); In re Jogminas'
Estate, 246 Ill. App. 518 (1927) (no jurisdiction).
In some jurisdictions there is a rule that an estate by the entirety cannot exist
in personal property. Annots., 8 A.L.R. 1017, 1022 (1920), 117 AL.R. 915, 922 (1938).
However, these jurisdictions need not adopt the rule that an executory contract
to sell by tenants by the entirety severs their tenancy ipso facto. As long as the
contract is executory, the tenants still have title to the land, even if the title is only
held as security. Therefore, if one of the tenants dies before closing date, the
surviving tenant should survive to all right, title, and interest in the land. Thus,
a court could consistently apply the rule that there can be no tenancy by the entirety
in personalty and still repudiate the doctrine of the Buford and Baker cases. The
Michigan, New York, and Wisconsin courts follow the rule that there can be no
tenancy by the entirety in personalty. Scholten v. Scholten, 238 Mich. 679, 214 N.W.
320 (1927); In re Blumenthal's Estate, 236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911 (1932); Aaby v.
Kaupanger (Citizens Nat'l Bank), 197 Wis. 56, 221 N.W. 417 (1928). These same courts
reject the doctrine of the Buford and Baker cases. Detroit & Security Trust Co. v.
Kramer, supra note 32; In re Maguire's Estate, supra; Kurowski v. Retail Hardware
MNut. Fire Ins. Co. of Minn., supra.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1959], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss1/9
COMMENTS
Certainly this doctrine of severance could make every Missouri title resting
upon the conveyance of a surviving joint tenant doubtful. This is so because most
contracts for the sale of land are not recorded and therefore an abstract of title
will not show what contracts, if any, preceded a given conveyance; and, where the
abstract shows a conveyance by a surviving joint tenant, there is no showing as to
whether (1) the deceased tenant joined with the surviving tenant in making the
contract of sale and then died, or whether (2) the deceased tenant died and sub-
sequently the surviving tenant entered into the contract after he had already
survived to all of the right, title, and interest in the land. The possibility of alterna-
tive (1) turning up would, it is submitted, be enough to make any Missouri title
resting on such a conveyance of a surviving tenant unmarketable, and it is possible
that such a title would not even be good in fact if the Missouri supreme court
followed the Iowa and Nebraska courts.
Another practical difficulty arises when the joint tenants contract to sell their
land to a purchaser and either the purchaser defaults or the contract is rescinded
by the mutual assent of the parties. Under the doctrine of the Buford and Baker
cases, it logically follows that the former joint tenants, having become tenants in
common when the contract was entered into, would continue to hold as tenants
in common.36 Therefore, if the tenants want to hold the land in joint tenancy again,
it would probably be necessary for them to create a new joint tenancy by con-
veyances through a straw party or by a direct conveyance under section 442.025,
Missouri Revised Statutes (1957 Supp.).
Typically, however, after a default or rescission the tenants will not realize that
they now hold as tenants in common; they will not re-create a joint tenancy in
themselves; and when one of the tenants dies, the deceased tenant's interest will not
continue in the survivor. Thus will the tenants' intention be effectively frustrated
without their knowing it. Furthermore, this will not appear in the usual abstract
of title.
The Missouri lawyer, in drafting instruments for his clients, may want to steer
clear of this possible pitfall. How he can do this has been well expressed by the
late Stuart P. Dobbs, whose advice to Utah lawyers is equally applicable to Missouri
lawyers:
Courts do not usually apply fictions to determine property rights except
where the transactions themselves do not speak with authority as to the
intent of the parties. A clause, stating in plain English that the sellers are
to be joint tenants in the proceeds of the sale, and in the title, if the sale
fails to become effective, would almost certainly be given effect. .... 37
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36. Of course, a court might hold that upon termination of the contract the
status quo is restored for all purposes including the joint tenancy.
37. Dobbs, Effect of Executory Contract Sale on Joint Tenancy Interests, 25
UTAH B. BuLL. 87, 89 (1955).
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